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A peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict has eluded the international system for 
sixty-seven years. As time passes, insoluble physical and political conditions in the 
region risk the achievement of a lasting peace. Standing in the way is the European 
Union’s (EU) tempestuous relationship with Israel. In order to forge a peaceful settlement 
of the conflict, an understanding of EU foreign policy toward Israel is necessary. This 
thesis seeks to explain the permissive cause of EU foreign policy toward Israel using the 
case study of the Arab-Israeli Conflict between 1973 and 2010. In the context of the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict, three widely held international relations theories that demonstrate 
explanatory power for EU foreign policy are realism, constructivism, and liberalism. The 
case study illustrates, however, that in conformance with the principles of liberal 
internationalism, EU foreign policy with respect to Israel is framed around the tenets of 
democracy, interdependent economic systems, and the employment of international 
institutions, which explains the volatile nature of the bi-lateral relationship. While the EU 
engages Israel with the breadth of its institutions and pursues an enduring economic 
relationship, Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories, perceived human rights 
violations, and settlement activity violate European democratic truths and strain the 
relationship. 
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The relationship between Europe and Israel is storied and complicated. Beginning 
more than fifty years before the establishment of the Jewish state, the association between 
Europe and the Jewish settlers is historically tense. Rising anti-Semitism within Europe, 
Zionist terrorism against the mandatory power of Great Britain, and the atrocities of the 
Holocaust characterized the tension between the two communities. Following the 
creation of the Jewish state in 1948, Israel sought legitimacy within the international 
system and relief from its isolation. Cultural ties, geographic proximity, and economic 
linkages drove Israel to strengthen its relationship with Europe.1 To this end, Israel 
sought membership in the European Economic Community (EEC). Although denied 
membership, in the 1960s, Europe and Israel forged a strengthened economic partnership 
setting the conditions for deeper relations. The aftermath of the October War in 1973, 
however, disrupted relations as the European Community (EC) recognized the plight of 
the Palestinian people. The Venice declaration in 1980 formalized the EC’s posture on 
the Arab-Israeli Conflict and derailed an already tenuous relationship with Israel.2 The 
relationship has yet to recover. 
Since the Venice declaration, The EU has failed to separate its foreign policy 
toward Israel from the greater Arab-Israeli Conflict. Broadly speaking, as expressed in 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the EU’s foreign policy is centered on 
“guaranteeing peace, stability, and prosperity” among its Eastern and Mediterranean 
neighbors.3 The EU aims to achieve this through economic, social, and political 
cooperation.4 Following the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, the EU promulgated in 
the Essen declaration that “Israel should ‘enjoy special status in its relations with the 
                                                 
1 Sharon Pardo and Joel Peters, Israel and the European Union: A Documentary History (New York: 
Lexington Books, 2012), 1.  
2 Ibid., 151–52.   
3 Beste İşleyen, The European Union In the Middle East Peace Process: A Civilian Power? (Stuttgart: 
Ibidem-Verlag, 2008), 68; European External Action Service, “European Security Strategy,” (Brussels: 
European Council,2003), 8, http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/european-security-
strategy/index_en.htm.  
4 İşleyen, A Civilian Power?, 68–9. 
2 
European Union on the basis of reciprocity and common interest.’”5 Subsequently, the 
EU formalized its economic and political relationship with Israel with a Euro-
Mediterranean Association Agreement, which for the first time established political 
discourse between the EU and Israel.6 This relationship deepened further when the EU 
initiated the EU/Israel Action Plan under its European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 
2004, focusing on closer bilateral political cooperation and economic integration. EU 
foreign policy objectives and Israeli behavior, however, ultimately, could not be 
reconciled causing a break in their deepening cooperation.7 
While enduring ties remain between Israel and the European Union in the 
economic and science sectors, politically the relationship between the EU and Israel 
remains volatile. Europe desires a greater role in reaching a peaceful resolution to the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict, yet its behavior toward Israel endangers its achievement. Why does 
Europe desire a greater role and what are its implications on Europe, Israel, regional 
stability, and the international system? The answer to these questions lies in the answer to 
the next question. What is the permissive cause of the EU’s foreign policy toward Israel? 
This thesis will establish that liberal internationalism provides the most 
compelling explanation for the EU’s approach to Israel. The theories of realism and 
constructivism contribute to this explanation; however, only liberal internationalism 
yields the permissive cause. 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
In the 2010 National Security Strategy, President Barack Obama identified U.S. 
national interests as security, including U.S. allies; economic prosperity within an 
international free market system, the realization of universal values globally, and a stable 
                                                 
5 Sharon Pardo and Joel Peters, Uneasy Neighbors: Israel and the European Union (New York: 
Lexington Books, 2010), 65. 
6 European Union, EU-Israel Association Agreement, accessed November 26, 2014, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/israel/eu_israel/political_relations/agreements/index_en.htm.   
7 Ibid., 48, 58–60, 68.  
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and cooperative international order.8 The Middle East is a decisive battleground for the 
achievement of these interests. To this end, the United States’ first objective in the region 
is achieving a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict. For decades, the United 
States has assumed responsibility for facilitating peace in the region but to no avail. 
Failure to achieve a peaceful resolution of the conflict risks the security of Israel, 
enduring regional instability, an expanding humanitarian crisis, and the sustainment of 
global terrorism. In his 2010 National Security Strategy, President Barack Obama stated 
that “to solve problems, we will pursue modes of cooperation that reflect evolving 
distributions of power and responsibility.”9 Again, in his commencement address at the 
United States Military Academy in 2014, Obama reinforced his commitment to 
multilateral action to secure international order.10 Like the United States, the European 
Union (EU) supports a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and represents 
a capable partner in achieving peace in the Middle East. The United States, however, 
approaches the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict maintaining a special relationship with Israel, 
demonstrated by Israel’s status as the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign aid 
since World War Two, as well as its status as the largest annual recipient of aid between 
1976 and 2004. Annual grants to Israel total an average of $3 billion.11 In contrast, the 
EU’s focus tends to be on the creation of a Palestinian state.12 In support of this 
objective, the EU is the largest donor of foreign aid to the Palestinians.13 In order to 
progress multilateral cooperation toward Middle East peace, the U.S. must establish an 
understanding of the EU’s policies toward Israel. It is not enough to identify European 
                                                 
8 President of the United States, “National Security Strategy,” (Washington, DC, 2010), 17, 
http://nssarchive.us/?page_id=8.   
9 Ibid., 46.  
10 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement 
Ceremony,” The White House, May 28, 2014, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-united-states-military-academy-commencement-ceremony.   
11 Jim Zanotti, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations (CRS Report RL33476) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, February 28, 2014), 28.  
12 Münevver Cebeci, “The Middle East and Iraq in EU and U.S. Foreign Policy: Implications for 
Transatlantic Relations,” in Issues in EU and U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. Münevver Cebeci (Blue Ridge 
Summit, PA: Lexington Books, 2011), 135. 
13 Ibid., 138.  
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foreign policy regarding Israel. The United States must identify the permissive cause of 
the EU’s relationship with Israel in order to facilitate U.S. engagement with the EU.  
The United States Unified Command Plan places responsibility for engagement 
with Israel with United States European Command (USEUCOM). This assignment 
recognizes the historical, cultural, economic, and political ties that exist between Israel 
and Europe and attempts to build upon it. Possessing an understanding of why the EU 
engages with and responds to Israel in certain ways will enable USEUCOM leadership to 
more effectively facilitate cooperation between Israel and the EU as well as manage 
potential conflict.  
Explaining the EU’s troubled relationship with Israel is significant from the 
academic perspective, as well. Currently, there are several studies available that attempt 
to provide a theoretical explanation for EU foreign policy; however, there is no 
compelling research available that addresses EU foreign policy as it specifically applies 
to Israel. In 1992, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) established the EU and the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The CFSP was the first step toward a 
unified foreign policy; however, it was not until the release of the first European Security 
Strategy (ESS) in 2003 that a unified foreign policy came to fruition. In that document, it 
states that the “resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe.”14 
With that in mind, further academic research is necessary to identify the implications of 
the EU-Israeli relationship on a resolution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Exploring the 
permissive cause of the EU’s policies toward Israel will contribute to a better 
understanding of EU political integration, as well as potential implications of the EU-
Israeli relationship in the long-term. 
B. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION  
This thesis draws from international relations (IR) theory to identify the 
permissive cause of the EU’s relationship with Israel. There is extensive scholarship on 
theoretical explanations for EU integration; however, applying IR theory to the EUs 
CSFP is a recent phenomenon. Still, scholars have applied the breadth of IR theories to 
                                                 
14 Cebeci, “EU and U.S. Foreign Policy,” 135.  
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European foreign policy and specific elements of it. The literature, however, fails to 
address EU foreign policy toward Israel. In seeking an explanation for EU policy toward 
Israel, I explore the realist, constructivist, and liberal theories. A prominent argument that 
scholarship presents is realism, which is broken down into two sub-schools of classical 
and neorealism. While it is a compelling argument, for many scholars, realism fails to 
explain why the many actors within the EU cooperate in regard to foreign policy. They 
argue that social constructivism has more explanatory power. Although it has received 
the least attention, the liberal perspective is gaining advocacy, specifically neoliberalism 
and liberal internationalism. 
1. Realism 
Scholars of the realist school of IR theory frame their argument against the 
anarchic nature of the international system, one defined by the absence of a hierarchical 
international authority.15 These scholars portray realism as a family of theories that 
recognizes that the range of possible outcomes in IR is highly constrained and these 
constraints are inescapable. The result is unavoidable competition and power politics. 
States, the principal actors within the international system, are self-interested and egoistic 
and conduct themselves according to fixed interests or preferences.16 States’ inevitably 
behave in certain ways as a result of the constraints of human nature, the nature of the 
state, and the architecture of the international system.17 Classical realism and structural 
realism qualify the effects of human nature and the nature of the state, respectively, on 
the international system.  
Scholarship on neorealism builds on the foundation of classical realism, which is 
represented by seminal arguments from Hobbes, Carr, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau.18 These 
                                                 
15 William C. Wohlforth, “Realism,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, ed. Christian 
Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199219322.003.0007. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1959), 160, 162–63. 
18 See Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1986).  
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scholars maintain that human nature, the intrinsic character of all people, drives 
international outcomes. Niebuhr contends that “society . . . merely cumulates the egoism 
of individuals and transmutes their individual altruism into collective egoism so that the 
egoism of the group has a double force. For this reason, no group acts from purely 
unselfish or even mutual intent and politics is therefore bound to be a contest of 
power.”19 Morgenthau, considered a leading figure in realist thought, expands the 
argument by crediting the lust for power as the driving force behind international 
relations, spurring domestic and international conflict as well as statecraft.20 Power is an 
end in itself, and furthermore, statesmen are morally obligated to its pursuit.21   
Neorealism or structural realism, formulated by Kenneth Waltz, contends that the 
range of possible outcomes in IR is highly constrained by the architecture of the 
international system. The result is unavoidable competition and power politics. Contrary 
to the perspective of classical realism, all states derive their preferences and behavior 
exogenously as a result of the structure of the international system. Waltz describes 
structure as a set of constraining conditions that emerges from the arrangement of the 
states within the international system.22 Its effects are generated “through socialization of 
the actors and through competition among them.”23 The social process pressures states to 
assume similar attributes and like behavior, and subsequently, competition expels those 
states that do not comply with the rules of the system.24 Although cooperation among 
states achieves peace, within the anarchic system it is difficult to achieve. Realist 
scholarship maintains that cooperation is difficult to achieve because of the collective 
action problem. Jean Jacques Rousseau illustrates the collective action problem through 
his narrative of the stag hunt. In this narrative, there are five hunters, all of which must 
                                                 
19 As quoted in Smith, Realist Thought, 107. 
20 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (Boston: 
McGraw-Hill, 1993), 29. 
21 Ibid., 13, 19.  
22 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 73, 81. 
23 Ibid., 74.   
24 Adrian Hyde-Price, “Neorealism: A Structural Approach to CSDP,” in Explaining the EU’s 
Common Security and Defense Policy: Theory in Action, ed. Xymen Kurowska and Fabian Breuer (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 23, doi:10.1057/9780230355729.0007.  
7 
cooperate in order to kill a stag and benefit from its meat. If every hunter participates, the 
stag will provide enough food for them all; however, without cooperation, none of the 
hunters will eat. A hare will provide enough food for one hunter. Confronted by a hare, 
one of the hunters kills it.25 Because of the absence of order within the hunting party, the 
hunter cannot control the actions of the other hunters; therefore, he kills the hare to 
ensure that he will not be selected out of the system. In international politics, defection is 
preferred to joint cooperation because of the relative gains problem in which an 
adversary’s relative gains over an actor introduce vulnerability and potential 
victimization.26 In the stag hunt, the hunter acted rationally within the nature of the 
system or in a way calculated to reach certain ends. Likewise, structural realism 
maintains that states will act rationally in order to achieve their preferences within the 
framework of the international system. Although peace is attainable through cooperation 
among states, the absence of a hierarchy of authority within the anarchic international 
system necessitates a self-help system in which states compete in order to ensure their 
survival.27 States seek to maximize their security, and power is a means to that end.  
Mearsheimer builds upon the core principles of Waltz’s structural realism in his 
presentation of the sub-theory of offensive realism. For Mearsheimer, like Waltz, the 
international system is defined by anarchy. Within this system, individual state actors are 
assumed to maintain offensive military capabilities. Because of the lack of ordering 
authority and this latent military capability, there is an enduring uncertainty regarding the 
actions of the other actors within the system. In the context of uncertainty, states aim to 
survive and will act rationally to ensure it.28 In offensive realism, however, because of 
the uncertainty and desire for survival, states “must make worst case assumptions about 
their rivals’ intentions,” according to Mearsheimer.29 To achieve security, states 
maximize their pursuit of power relative to the other actors within the international 
                                                 
25 As referenced in Waltz, Man, the State, and War, 167–69. 
26 Hyde-Price, “Neorealism,” 21.   
27 Ibid., 19–20.  
28 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), 30–
31. 
29 Ibid., 45. 
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system.30 The desired end-state, according to offensive realists, is global hegemony, 
which inadvertently increases the risk of war in the international system because 
competing states will assume greater risk to counter the potential hegemon’s growth in 
power.31 For Mearsheimer, hegemony correlates to domination of the international 
system and is classified as regional or global. Furthermore, he maintains that although 
there has never been a global hegemon, the United States is the only state to achieve 
regional hegemony in modern history. Implicit with the notion of hegemony is the 
hegemon’s desire to maintain the status quo.32 Conversely, Waltz, representing defensive 
realism, posits that “in anarchy, security is the highest end. . . . The first concern of states 
is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system.33 For scholars of 
defensive realism, state survival is achieved not by seeking hegemonic status but by 
maintaining the status quo through a balance of power. Excessive accumulation of power 
results in a security dilemma, which increases the volatility and uncertainty of the 
international system and endangers state security.34  
There is no universally accepted realist argument supporting EU foreign policy, 
rather there is a plurality of explanations in mainstream scholarship that draw from the 
range of realist thought, to include classical realism, neoclassical realism, offensive 
realism, and defensive realism. Neoclassical realists contend that collective EU foreign 
policy is determined by a combination of material interests and normative values, while 
some realists maintain that it is a result of EU bandwagoning with the United States.35 
                                                 
30 Eric J. Hamilton and Brian C. Rathbun, “Scarce Differences: Toward a Material and Systemic 
Foundation for Offensive and Defensive Realism,” Security Studies 22, no. 3 (2013): 445, 
doi:10.1080/09636412.2013.81625.   
31 Mearsheimer, Great Power Politics, 29, 167.   
32 Ibid., 40–42. 
33 As quoted in Glenn H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World—Offensive Realism and the Struggle for 
Security: A Review Essay,” International Security 27, no. 1 (2002): 152, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3092155.   
34 Eric J. Labs, “Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims,” Security 
Studies 6, no. 4 (1997): 9–10, doi:10.1080/09636419708429321.   
35 Sten Rynning, “Realism and the Common Security and Defense Policy,” Journal of Common 
Market Studies 49, no. 1 (2011): 25; Lorenzo Cladi & Andrea Locatelli, “Bandwagoning, Not Balancing: 
Why Europe Confounds Realism,” Contemporary Security Policy 33, no. 2 (2012): 282, doi: 
10.1080/13523260.2012.693792; Barry R. Posen, “ESDP and the Structure of World Power,” The 
International Spectator 39, no. 1 (2004): 6–7. 
9 
The most prevalent arguments, however, address balance of power and regional security 
dynamics. The regional security explanation focuses on a growing desire within the EU 
to establish autonomy from the United States in addressing regional threats. Proponents 
of the regional autonomy argument use the conflict in the Balkans in 1999 to demonstrate 
the establishment of a collective EU military capability and foreign policy. The American 
reassessment of interests following the Cold War translated to decreased American 
engagement in the defense of Europe. To ensure that European interests were met, while 
concurrently increasing U.S. interest in the EU, the member states established the 
European Security Defense Policy (ESDP) and the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF)—a token 
EU security force.36  
Balance of power explanations include the perceived necessity by the EU member 
states to balance a relative rise in German power following its reunification. A second 
dominant explanation is that the EU is balancing against American unipolarity within the 
international system. Fearing the development of an unbalanced multipolar system within 
Europe, the first argument maintains that the major European powers of the United 
Kingdom and France seek foreign policy cooperation within the EU to limit Germany’s 
ability to increase its relative regional power and influence. The smaller member states 
support cooperation in order to maintain the status quo within Europe but also to gain 
relative power that is unattainable at the national level.37 In keeping with the framework 
of neorealism, advocates of the balance-of-power theory argue that the fall of the Soviet 
Union ushered in a unipolar international system dominated by the United States. 
Although the EU has an enduring relationship with the U.S. United States, the structure 
of a unipolar system fosters uncertainty and alarm for the member states of the EU. As a 
result, the EU increased its political and security cooperation to achieve global power and 
36 Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing,” International
Security 30, no. 1 (2005): 91, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137459; Rynning, “Common Security and 
Defense Policy,” 27; Robert J. Art, Stephen G. Brooks, William C. Wohlforth, Keir A. Lieber and Gerard 
Alexander, “Striking the Balance,” International Security 30, no. 3 (2005): 181, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4137491.    
37 Michael Kluth and Jess Pilegaard, “The Making of the EU’s External Action Service: A Neorealist
Interpretation,” European Foreign Affairs Review 17, no. 2 (2012): 312–313.  
10 
to influence the United States.38 This perspective maintains that the EU employs soft 
balancing to compete with the U.S.. According to Art, “balancing is as much about 
preserving a state’s autonomy, independence, and ability to influence international 
outcomes vis-a-vis a powerful state or group of states as it is about dealing with threats of 
direct attack from them.”39 Soft balancing includes regional collaboration, such as the 
EU; limited military expansion; and cooperative exercises.”40 In response to the balance-
of-power theory, there are opposing arguments that claim that the EU does not have the 
military resources to balance the U.S.; the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) 
is the result of regional security requirements, rather than balancing; and finally that EU 
foreign policy supports bandwagoning with the U.S.41 
2. Constructivism
Championed by influential political scientists like Onuf, Adler, and Wendt, 
constructivism attempts to bridge the divide between material and idealist theories, such 
as realism and liberalism.42 Constructivism, like realism, focuses on the architecture of 
the international system and defines the international system as anarchical in nature; 
however, according to Wendt, international relations do not have to focus on fear and 
competition, rather international outcomes depend on the nature of the interactions 
between states.43 Whereas realists believe that states’ interests are fixed and derived 
exogenously, constructivists argue that a state’s identity and interests are endogenous to 
the social process. Although constructivism recognizes the potential for power politics 
and competition, it does not view the constraints of the international system as 
38 Kluth and Pilegaard, “EU’s External Action Service,” 311.
39 Art, Brooks, Wohlforth, Lieber and Alexander, “Striking the Balance,” 185.
40 Brooks and Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing,” 73.
41 Brooks and Wohlforth, “Hard Times for Soft Balancing,” 92–3; Cladi and Locatelli,
“Bandwagoning, Not Balancing,” 282. 
42 Ian Hurd, “Constructivism,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, ed. Christian
Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199219322.003.0017. 
43 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,”
International Organization 46, no.2 (1992): 403.  
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unescapable or the outcomes fixed.44 Anarchy does not determine the nature of the 
international system or the behavior of individual actors. Constructivist literature 
maintains that the range of outcomes in international politics depends on the relationship 
between states. States establish their identities from the historical, cultural, political, and 
social context of which they are immersed.45 As states begin interaction, each actor bases 
its behavior on the perceived probability that the other actor will be either amiable or 
threatening. Actors subsequently determine their interests as well as that of their 
counterparts as they continue to respond to each other. This interaction creates 
intersubjective meaning, which generates expectations of future behavior.46 The shared 
norms that result from persistent socialization inform state actions. As the nature of the 
interactions between states change, the resulting change in identities and interests will 
lead to a change in political outcomes and thus the potential achievement of 
cooperation.47 The literature pursues the constructivist argument further, attesting that 
material things, such as power, do not have fixed meaning as realists would argue but 
derive their meanings from the social process. Although states share similar factors, such 
as material things, they do not behave identically because they have different 
perspectives based on the social process. It is no more likely for a relationship between 
states to resemble a balance of power like realists would expect than it is for the 
relationship between states to be supported by international institutions.48 While 
constructivists concentrate on the primacy of ideas and the social process in international 
relations, they still account for material resources. Economic and military powers help 
shape actor identities and are factors in the social process.49 Moreover, the ideational 
power of constructivism lends itself to collaboration with other theories to provide greater 
explanatory power in regard to foreign policy outcomes within the international system.  
                                                 
44 Wendt, “Social Construction of Power Politics,” 394–95.  
45 Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International 
Security 23, no. 1 (1998): 176, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539267.   
46 Wendt, “Social Construction of Power Politics,” 404–06.  
47 Ibid., 407.  
48 Ibid., 399. 
49 Hopf, “Promise of Constructivism,” 177–80.  
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The application of the constructivist theoretical perspective to explain EU foreign 
policy is a recent endeavor. The principle argument concentrates on the emergence of a 
strategic culture within the EU, which unifies European foreign policy decision-making. 
Strategic culture, according to Meyer, “consists of the socially transmitted, identity-
derived norms, ideas, and habits that are shared among the most influential actors and 
social groups within a given political community, which help to shape a ranked set of 
options for a community’s pursuit of security and defense goals.”50 The literature on the 
CSDP (formerly the ESDP) recognizes a nascent European strategic culture. According 
to Biava, Drent, and Herd, “the [strategic] culture is based on an enlarged vision of 
security and on a comprehensive, multilateral and internationally legitimated approach to 
threats, implying the use of all sorts of instruments (military and civilian) in an integrated 
manner.”51 This culture is cultivated through socialization and learning. First, changing 
threat perceptions following the collapse of the Soviet Union have altered strategic 
norms. Second, supranational institutions within the CSDP, such as the European 
Military Committee (EUMC) and the Office for the High Representative (OHR), are 
altering strategic norms through the socialization of member state representatives. Third, 
the framing of humanitarian and security crises by European media initiate societal 
learning toward increased regional and global response.52 The EU strategic culture 
perspective does identify obstacles to a unified EU foreign policy. These include a lack of 
consensus among member states regarding foreign policy objectives and instruments, 
diverging national strategic cultures, and a reluctance by the member states to cede 
authority over CSDP to an EU executive power.53 The constructivist explanation for a 
                                                 
50 Christoph O. Meyer, “The Purpose and Pitfalls of Constructivist Forecasting: Insights from 
Strategic Culture Research for the European Union’s Evolution as a Military Power,” International Studies 
Quarterly 55, no. 3 (2011): 677, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00648.x.   
51 Aleesia Biava, Margriet Drent, and Graeme P. Herd, “Characterizing the European Union’s 
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unified EU foreign policy challenges the realist perspective and it is gaining ground 
among scholars.  
3. Liberalism 
Liberalism as an IR theory is dominant in western civilization. Built upon the 
beliefs of men like Kant and Wilson, its fundamental principles, as defined by Hoffman, 
are “the protection of individual freedom, the reduction of state power, and the conviction 
that power is legitimate only if it is based on consent and respects basic freedom.”54 Kant 
sought a peaceful world order but recognized that the international political system is 
defined by anarchy, and states are egoistic and self-interested profit maximizers.55 
Drawing from Kant, Russett and Oneal maintain that Kant’s vision of a peaceful 
international system requires three elements: democracy, economic interdependence, and 
international organizations.56 Implicit in the notion of democracy is the protection of 
human rights, the right to self-determination, and the imposition of rule of law. A 
necessary condition for liberalism is domestic support.  
According to Moravcsik, “in the liberal conception of domestic politics, the state 
is not an actor but a representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, 
construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors. Representative institutions 
and practices constitute the critical ‘transmission belt’ by which the preferences and 
social power of individuals and groups are translated into state policy.”57 Moravcsik 
continues, arguing that, state governments are constrained in their decision making by 
these domestic preferences. Liberal scholarship maintains that unlike realism, domestic 
preferences are generated independent of international structure, and contrary to 
                                                 
54 As quoted in Roland Paris, “Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,” 
International Security 22, no. 3 (1997), 59, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539367.  
55Richard K. Betts, Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace (New York: 
Pearson, 2013), 136. 
56 Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and 
International Organizations (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001), 35–38.  
57 Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” 
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constructivist beliefs, these preferences precede inter-state interaction.58 Domestic 
preferences, however, do not command specific state behavior, rather they influence state 
behavior along with the preferences of the other actors within the international system.59 
Forged from the foundation of the general liberal IR theory, political scientists present 
neo-liberal institutionalism and liberal internationalism as two significant sub-theories in 
explaining EU foreign policy.  
Neo-liberal institutionalism recognizes the anarchical nature of the international 
political system; however, its proponents, to include Keohane, conclude that the effects 
of anarchy can be mitigated through international institutions. Neoliberal literature is 
more optimistic about cooperation in the order-less international system than realist 
scholarship. States seek cooperation when it is in their self-interest; however, the threat of 
defection serves as an obstacle to cooperation. As depicted by the prisoner’s dilemma, 
each actor seeks to maximize its absolute gains. While the greatest gains are achieved 
when an actor defects and the other cooperates, if both defect then neither actor will 
benefit.60 Within the neoliberal institutionalist perspective, states will establish 
institutions to facilitate cooperation. North defines institutions as “the rules of the game 
in society, or more formally, [the] humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction.”61 Institutional rules encourage multi-iteration engagements, which increase 
the costs of defection and the benefits of long-term cooperation; expand interaction 
across issue areas; increase the flow of information; and reduce transaction costs.62 
Institutions have proven effective in the economic sector but Keohane argues that 
institutions can be effective in the security realm as well, decreasing uncertainty among 
actors and enabling utility maximization through increased information sharing.63  
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Liberal internationalism operationalizes and exports the tenets of liberalism: 
democracy, interdependent economies, and international institutions. Supported by the 
belief that democratic countries do not go to war with each other and economic 
interdependence discourages conflict, liberal internationalism facilitates multi-lateral 
action.64 The preponderance of contemporary literature maintains that theoretically 
liberal internationalism has the potential to reduce global conflict and increase 
cooperation; however, in practice it lacks credibility and legitimacy. Haine argues that as 
a sub-theory “it remains ambivalent about the use of force, ambiguous about the 
opportunity of humanitarian interventions, vague about the degree of involvement 
morally required, and relatively helpless and mute about the devastating effects of 
nationalism, tribalism, ethnicity, and religious extremism.”65  
There is a paucity of research available that tests liberal causation for EU foreign 
policy, specifically the CSDP. The limited literature, however, provides two diverging 
assessments on the behavior of EU foreign policy. The first argument is that the extent of 
integration and behavior of EU foreign policy is a result of domestic pressures on the 
member states. Moreover, national norms and perceived national interests influence EU 
action. Liberal scholarship maintains that the domestic preferences within member states 
are mostly for humanitarian and civil engagement with an emphasis on crisis 
management.66 The second argument concludes that although liberal internationalism 
accounts for EU policy action, the EU has failed to meet its objectives.67 This is a result 
of a risk-adverse European culture, a failure in clearly defining the appropriate means for 
achieving success, and a lack of sufficient military capabilities.68  
                                                 
64 Martin Griffiths, Rethinking International Relations Theory (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
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C. HYPOTHESES 
Drawing upon extensive scholarship in IR theory and tested against the case study 
of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, three hypotheses are investigated in this thesis to determine 
the permissive cause of EU foreign policy toward Israel. Originating from the three 
divergent theories of realism, constructivism, and liberalism, these potential explanations 
encompass a broad range of causal factors. While it is likely that elements of each 
hypothesis influence EU foreign policy and represent sufficient causes, this thesis aims to 
identify the necessary cause.  
The first Hypothesis stipulates that the EU seeks bi-lateral engagement with Israel 
and reacts to Israeli domestic and foreign policies in a manner meant to balance the 
United States. A defensive neorealist argument, this hypothesis maintains that the EU 
seeks security of its interests, which it does through increasing involvement in 
international politics. The EU, however, lacks the military and physical resources 
necessary to directly balance the United States as the unipolar power within the 
international system; therefore, it soft balances the United States through the employment 
of a divergent political posture, economic cooperation and integration with Israel, crisis 
management operations, and Palestinian state building. 
A second hypothesis identifies a European strategic culture that is derived from 
shared norms, history, and interests. This constructivist perspective links congruous 
European and Israeli strategic cultures, which is illustrated in the EU’s pursuit of 
Mediterranean regional integration through the EMP and the ENP. It is these strategic 
cultures and half a century of socialization that have cultivated trust and expectations of 
behavior between the EU and Israel, subsequently driving EU foreign policy.  
The third and final hypothesis posits that EU foreign policy toward Israel is 
framed around the tenets of democracy, interdependent economic systems, and the 
employment of international institutions. In keeping with the theory of liberal 
internationalism, the EU seeks to achieve international cooperation and stability through 
its foreign policy. This approach explains the volatile nature of the bi-lateral relationship. 
The EU continues to engage Israel with the breadth of its institutions and pursues an 
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enduring economic relationship; however, Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian 
territories, perceived human rights violations, and settlement activity violate European 
democratic truths and strain the relationship. 
Although all three hypotheses include causal factors, this thesis argues that the 
most compelling explanation for EU foreign policy toward Israel is the liberal 
internationalist argument.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
To evaluate these hypotheses I use the single case study of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
from 1973 to 2010. Almost every European policy decision regarding Israel has been 
made within the context of the Arab-Israeli Conflict and therefore it provides ample 
empirical data to test the hypotheses. The focus of this case study begins in 1973, the year 
of the October War, because it marks the first year in which the EC took a unified stance 
toward Israel. All previous engagement with Israel was executed by individual member 
states and, therefore, presents inadequate data. The end date is 2010 after which relevant 
sources become scarce and EU foreign policy remains relatively constant.   
In understanding the research approach of this thesis, first a common 
understanding of terms must be reached. A pre-requisite for assessing the quality of the 
empirical data within this thesis is a common definition for the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 
Within this thesis, the Arab-Israeli Conflict is defined as any activity between Israel and 
neighboring Arabs that concerns the existence of the Jewish state and the final status of 
the contested land of Palestine. This treatment includes Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Hamas, Hizbullah, and the Palestinians. Additionally, the scope of the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict case study includes empirical data from almost two decades prior to the 
formation of the EU. During this period, it was known as the EEC and the EC. For the 
purpose of this thesis, however, the collection of European member states will be 
identified as the EU. 
This thesis draws from primary source documents ranging from treaties, 
resolutions, and agreements to policy memorandums and speeches from EU and Israeli 
leadership as well as secondary sources ranging from academic journals and books to 
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think tank reports. These sources aim to illustrate Israeli behavior within the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict and its associated EU foreign policy responses in order to elucidate the 
permissive cause of EU foreign policy toward Israel. 
E. THE EVOLUTION OF EU FOREIGN POLICY 
In December 1969 at the Hague Summit, the six member states of the EC, which 
included Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands identified the need “for a united Europe capable of assuming its 
responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate 
with its traditions and its mission.”69 In response, the Davignon report was penned and 
approved in 1970 establishing the framework for European Political Cooperation (EPC). 
Although, a step toward a unified foreign policy, the EPC only represented a forum 
through which the EC could communicate on matters of international politics and 
reconcile divergent perspectives in order to strengthen European integration.70 Over the 
next two decades EPC was formalized and increasingly integrated into the institutions of 
the EC; however, there was no mechanism for unified action and divergence in the 
foreign policies of the member states remained.71 In November 1993 the EC 
implemented the TEU. Establishing the European Union, the treaty also created the CFSP 
with the following objectives: 
 to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence 
of the Union; 
 to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;  
 to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with 
the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the 
Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter; 
 to promote international cooperation; 
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 to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.72  
Furthermore, the TEU foreshadowed the development of a common defense policy, 
which was established in the form of the ESDP at the Cologne European Council 
Meeting in 1999. The ESDP operationalized the CFSP, calling for an autonomous 
military capability within the EU that in concert with civilian capabilities could conduct 
crisis management operations internationally.73 Those crisis management tasks, as 
defined in the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, include humanitarian operations, military advice 
and assistance, conflict prevention, peace-keeping, peace-making, and post-conflict 
stabilization.74 Moreover, the treaty strengthened the CSFP and ESDP’s bureaucratic 
structure.75 Since the development of EPC, the EU has increased the scope of its 
integration and in turn gained prominence as an international actor, participating in more 
than twenty crisis management operations. The EU’s growing influence on international 
politics is demonstrated by its relationship with Israel and its role in the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict.  
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II. CASE STUDY: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT  
The Arab-Israeli conflict began in essence with the burgeoning Zionist movement 
of the late nineteenth century and the Balfour Declaration of 1917 in which Britain 
declared that “His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine 
of a national home for the Jewish people.”76 Since these events, the disposition of historic 
Palestine has been contested. Amid increasing unrest in Palestine during the British 
Mandate, which began in 1920 and dissolved in 1948, Britain sought a United Nations 
(UN) managed solution to the crisis. In response, the UN approved resolution 181, the 
partition of Palestine, on 29 November 1947. The partition plan established two 
independent states, one Palestinian and one Jewish, and Jerusalem as an international city 
under UN trusteeship.77 Allocating fifty-six percent of Palestine to the Jewish state and 
forty-three percent to the Palestinian state, the UN Partition Plan was rejected by the 
Arabs and nominally accepted by the Zionists.78 In the immediate aftermath of the 
partition plan, however, fighting broke out between the Jewish and Arab residents of 
Palestine, negating the partition plan and creating a crisis that produced more than 
700,000 Palestinian refugees by 1949.79 UN Resolution 194, enacted in December 1948, 
affirms the right of return for Palestinian refugees; however, the refugee problem remains 
a substantive issue within the Arab-Israeli Conflict.  
On 15 May 1948 Zionist leader, David Ben-Gurion, declared the establishment of 
the State of Israel, precipitating the invasion of Israel by its Arab neighbors, including 
Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan. The armistice agreement, concluded a year later, 
confirmed Israel’s ownership of seventy-seven percent of Palestine, while Jordan 
                                                 
76 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli- Conflict: A History with Documents, 7th ed. 
(Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2010), 97.  
77 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 181 (II), “Future Government of Palestine,” Nov. 29, 
1947, 
http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/a06f2943c226015c85256c40005d359c/7f0af2bd897689b785256c330061d
253?OpenDocument.   
78 Joel Beinin and Lisa Hajjar, “Palestine, Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Primer,” The Middle 
East Research and Information Project, 2014: 4, http://www.merip.org/primer-palestine-israel-arab-israeli-
conflict-new.  
79 Ibid., 5.  
22 
assumed control of East Jerusalem and the West Bank and Egypt occupied the Gaza 
Strip.80 These boundaries, coined the “Green Line,” held until the Six Day War in 
1967.81 Responding to increasing tensions with its Arab neighbors and Egyptian 
provocation, which included the deployment of troops to the Sinai Peninsula, the 
expulsion of UN Emergency Force (UNEF) troops from the Sinai, and the closure of the 
Strait of Tiran to Israeli and Israel bound shipping, Israel attacked Egypt, Syria, and 
Jordan on 5 June 1967. Within six days Israel defeated the Arab bloc, seizing the Sinai 
Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank and East Jerusalem from 
Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. A military defeat for the Arab states and Arab 
nationalism, the Six Day War demonstrated the strength of Israel and altered the future 
course of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.  
Subsequently, on 22 November 1967, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 
242, calling for Israel’s withdrawal from territories it occupied in the Six Day War, as 
well as “termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and 
acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of 
every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized 
boundaries free from threats or acts of force.”82 The resolution was ambiguous regarding 
specific actions to be taken and was absent any reference to Palestinian self-
determination. Among the belligerents of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, it was accepted by 
Egypt, Jordan, and Israel but rejected by Iraq, Syria, and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO).83 Still, UN Resolution 242 remains the starting point for settlement 
of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 
The intervening years between the Six Day War and the October War in 1973 
were characterized by persistent low intensity tensions between the Arab states and 
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Israel, highlighted by a “War of Attrition” between Egypt and Israel from March 1969 to 
August 1970. In absence of an acceptable resolution of the Six Day War, Egypt employed 
artillery and engaged in commando raids against Israeli forces in the Suez Canal Zone in 
order to establish a position of power from which to enter political initiatives. Israel 
responded in kind with the aim of maintaining the status quo in the Sinai Peninsula. As 
Egypt increased its military actions, Israel did as well, leading to air strikes targeting 
military facilities across Egypt, to include Cairo. This escalation of hostilities precipitated 
Soviet intervention and resulted in the deployment of Soviet aircraft to Egypt and the 
employment of Soviet manned anti-aircraft systems. Amid widespread fear of an outright 
war, an American initiated cease fire was accepted by both parties on 8 August 1970. The 
status quo of the Arab-Israeli Conflict would hold until 1973 with the outbreak of the 
October War. Twenty-five years after the establishment of the State of Israel and the 
outbreak of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Europe would introduce itself as a player in Middle 
East politics and transform its relationship with Israel in the aftermath of the October 
War.84 
A. NASCENT EUROPEAN ENGAGEMENT IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI 
CONFLICT, 1973 – 1990 
1. The October War and its Aftermath 
On 6 October 1973 at just past two o’clock in the afternoon, the Second and Third 
Armies of the Egyptian Armed Forces commenced an attack on Israeli defensive 
positions at the Bar Lev line; the October War had begun. Coordinated with a Syrian 
attack against Israeli positions in the Golan Heights, the Egyptian forces broke the Bar-
Lev line and extended their advance six miles into the interior of the Sinai Peninsula by 7 
October. On the Syrian front the Syrians had overrun the Israeli positions and were 
threatening Israeli territory. Bolstered by the commencement of a full scale airlift of 
military supplies on 14 October; however, Israel assumed the offensive, retaking terrain 
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lost in Syria, penetrating the Egyptian front, and encircling Egypt’s Third Army.85 
Guided by the United States and the Soviet Union, both of whom feared escalation in the 
Cold War, a permanent cease fire was established on 25 October 1973 based on UN 
Security Council Resolutions 338 and 340.86 
The aftermath of the October War permanently thrust the EC into the politics of 
the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Since the first EPC meeting in 1970 the member states of the 
EC failed to reach a unified posture toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Of the nine member 
states (the Nine) Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom maintained 
relative neutrality toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict; the Netherlands, Denmark and West 
Germany maintained a pro-Israel posture; and Italy and France openly supported the 
Arab States.87 In the years following the EC’s failure to respond to the Six Day War 
France, the dominant power within the EC, pushed for increased EC influence in the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict to sever European dependence on U.S. foreign policy and to secure 
European interests in the Middle East.88  The outbreak of war on 6 October presented the 
Nine with an opportunity to demonstrate European consensus. Unable to agree on a 
substantive position, however, the Nine released a statement on 13 October concerning 
the hostilities but limited it to support of UN resolution 242.  
The Nine governments of the European Community greatly concerned 
over the resumption of hostilities in the Middle East appeal to those 
concerned to stop the fighting. The cease-fire which would spare the 
people suffering from the war from further tragic ordeals, must at the same 
time open the way to real negotiations on an appropriate basis so that the 
conflict may be settled in compliance with all provisions of resolution 242 
adopted on 22 November 1967 by the Security Council.89  
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Although the EC failed to release a decisive verbal statement, none of the Nine opened 
their borders for the transit of American resupply efforts to Israel, Britain withheld spare 
parts for Israeli military equipment, and France continued its arms embargo against the 
Jewish state.90 European actions during the war foreshadowed the European posture 
toward Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 
Beginning on 16 October, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) announced a seventy percent increase of crude oil prices, remaining in effect 
until the Israeli withdrawal of the occupied territories and the establishment of a 
Palestinian state. Subsequently, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OAPEC) threatened a five percent reduction in oil production each month. Additionally, 
OAPEC categorized its consumers based on those that were considered friendly states, 
neutral states, and enemy states. Based on their national foreign policies, France and 
Britain were recognized as friendly states and thus received no sanctions, the Netherlands 
was labeled an enemy state and was completely embargoed, and the remaining members 
of the EC were targeted by the monthly production cuts.91 
With forty-five percent of Western Europe’s energy resources originating from 
the Arab states, the oil crisis threatened the economic security of the EC.92 Furthermore, 
it was evident to the EC that the United States did not have European interests in mind as 
it crafted its foreign policy on the Middle East. America viewed the Middle East as a 
Cold War battle ground and did not want or envision European influence in the region.93 
Any European engagement in the Middle East, according to the Nixon administration, 
should receive American approval first, but while Kissinger sought an incremental 
bilateral approach to resolving the Israeli Conflict, Europe sought a comprehensive 
solution.94 
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a. The Brussels Declaration, 1973 
Forced into action, the EC released its first substantive declaration on the Arab-
Israeli Conflict on 6 November with the Brussels Declaration of 1973. The declaration 
contained four principle components:  
(i)   the inadmissibility of the acquisitions of territory by force; 
(ii) the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has 
maintained since the conflict in 1967; 
(iii) respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of 
every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and 
recognized boundaries; 
(iv) recognition that in the establishment of a just and lasting peace 
account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.95 
The declaration also called for any peace settlement to be conducted under the auspices 
of the UN with the support of “international guarantees.”96 Immediately Israel’s foreign 
minister, Abba Eban, responded claiming that the EC declaration sought “oil for Europe 
rather than peace for the Middle East.’”97 Publically, Israel chided the EC for ignoring 
the values, cultural ties, and economic relations that they shared and challenged the 
European assertions that territory should not be gained through war and that peace in the 
Middle East required an international approach.98 The state of Israel questioned the 
legitimacy and credibility of European political cooperation, highlighting its inability to 
prevent Arab aggression preceding the Six Day War and during the October War and its 
lack of assistance in achieving a cease-fire. Moreover, according to Eban, the EC 
endangered ongoing negotiations between the belligerents with its forced entry into the 
conflict. For Israel the conflict was between sovereign nations; its resolution would come 
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through direct negotiations, rather than international interference.99 The Brussels 
Declaration and Israel’s response established a volatile political climate for Euro-Israeli 
relations that limited European influence in the Arab-Israeli Conflict for the next two 
decades.  
The Nine’s joint declaration marked the first time that the rights of the 
Palestinians were acknowledged, an inclusion that would strengthen the EC’s relationship 
with the Arab states and mark a turning point in Europe’s posture toward the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict. Exploiting the nascent European consensus demonstrated with the Brussels 
Declaration, the Arab states appealed to the EC for the establishment of a sustained 
relationship between the EC and the Arab League. Launched in July 1974, the Euro-Arab 
Dialogue (EAD) was developed to create economic cooperation between Europe and the 
Arab states. While the Nine desired to avoid politics, to include the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
and the oil crisis, the Arab League’s underlying objective was to cultivate further 
European support for the Arab cause in the war against Israel.100 These objectives were 
demonstrated early in the relationship when the Arab League pressed the EC to annul a 
1975 trade agreement with Israel and sought independent PLO representation within the 
EAD. The EC conceded to neither of these demands.  
While the Brussels declaration represented a change in the European consensus 
toward Israel, the EC was not yet prepared to sever ties. In 1974, half of Israel’s imported 
goods originated from Europe and trade with the EC accounted for a third of Israeli 
exports.101 Politically, the EC behaved in accordance with its November declaration 
represented by its voting record in the 28th Session of the UN General Assembly in 1973. 
The Nine abstained or voted against any resolutions that exceeded the framework of their 
joint declaration.102 Still as the Euro-Arab relationship strengthened between 1974 and 
1977 amid the emergence of Jewish settlement activity in the occupied Palestinian 
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territories (OPT) and the rise of the Likud party in Israel, the EC turned further away 
from supporting Israel and adopted increasingly pro-Arab views.103 
b. The London Declaration, 1977 
Arab pressure to advance the European posture on the Arab-Israeli conflict 
coupled with increasingly alarming Israeli behavior caused the Nine to release the 
London Declaration in 1977. Reaffirming the Brussels Declaration, the new statement 
highlighted the need for a Palestinian homeland and the implementation of a 
comprehensive peace settlement. As stated in the declaration, “The Nine have affirmed 
their belief that a solution to the conflict in the Middle East will be possible only if the 
legitimate right of the Palestinian people to give effective expression to its national 
identity is translated into fact, which would take into account the need for a homeland for 
the Palestinian people.”104 The Nine sought a role for the Palestinians in a final 
settlement as well as for themselves. Released four months prior to Egyptian President 
Anwar Sadat’s unprecedented trip to Jerusalem and a little more than a year prior to the 
Camp David Summit, the London Declaration isolated the EC since neither Israel or the 
United States were seeking a comprehensive settlement, rather an Egyptian-Israeli 
agreement. Moreover, the negotiating parties were focused on an interim period of 
Palestinian self-government, rather than the establishment of a Palestinian homeland.105 
The Camp David Summit and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty signed on 26 March 
1979 solidified America’s leadership in resolving the Arab-Israeli Conflict and 
marginalized Europe’s role in the process. 
Still, the EC continued to highlight the need for a comprehensive settlement based 
on the framework of UN resolutions 242 and 338 and the establishment of a Palestinian 
homeland. Europe’s increasing divergence from the Israeli and American narrative was 
fueled by the burgeoning European desire to establish a European role in international 
politics as well as a response to Israeli actions toward the Arabs and the occupied 
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territories, which included the illegal establishment of settlement communities, the 
annexation of East Jerusalem, widespread destruction and confiscation of Arab property, 
and the displacement of Arab peoples from the occupied territories.106  
c. The Venice Declaration, 1980 
With the suspension of Palestinian autonomy talks between Egypt and Israel on 
10 May 1980, the Camp David Accords failed to make progress on a broader peace 
settlement. Seeing an opening for a European peace initiative, the EC announced the 
Venice Declaration in June 1980. The most substantive European joint statement on the 
Middle East to date, it was an attempt to launch Europe into the center of Arab-Israeli 
negotiations. Panned by the PLO for being too weak, but condemned by Israel for 
capitulating to Arab pressure, the Venice initiative made an indelible impact on Euro-
Israeli relations but failed to result in a greater role for Europe or a comprehensive peace. 
In accordance with its declaration, Europe commissioned two diplomatic missions to the 
Middle East in an effort to jump start the peace initiative; they both failed. In response to 
the declaration, Shimon Peres claimed that it “damages Europe first of all and reduces 
European influence on Israel and Middle East countries which truly seek peace.”107 The 
main principles on which the Venice Declaration was framed were the inclusion of the 
PLO in any and all negotiations and the Palestinian right to self-determination. It also 
reaffirmed Europe’s commitment to achieve a comprehensive settlement supported by 
international guarantees and confirmed its distain for illegal settlement activity.   
2. The Iron Fist  
By the time Menachem Begin took office as the Prime Minister of Israel in 1977, 
Palestinian nationalism had taken hold as the mechanism through which the Palestinian 
nation sought self-determination, represented by the PLO.108  Facing increasing 
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resistance and the emergence of civil society within the OPT, Begin and his Defense 
Minister, Ariel Sharon, aimed to eradicate the PLO and its influence within the occupied 
territories. To accomplish this Begin zeroed in on Lebanon because, according to Sharon, 
the destruction of the PLO in Lebanon was a prerequisite for the pacification of the 
OPT.109 Begin’s second approach to the destruction of Palestinian nationalism was the 
establishment of a civilian administration over the OPT beginning in 1981. The civil 
administration maintained a military presence within the OPT; however, its focus was the 
civil affairs of the Palestinian communities.110 In reality, through the civil administration 
Israel tightened its control over the Palestinians by replacing pro-PLO municipal 
leadership and enacting curfews, while increasing the frequency of deportations, the 
seizure and demolition of Palestinian property, and arbitrary and collective 
punishment.111 Israel’s failure to pacify the Arabs within Lebanon and the OPT led to the 
implementation of the Iron Fist policy in January 1985 designed to use “‘might, power, 
and beatings’ to quell the unrest.’”112 Ineffective in achieving Israeli political objectives, 
in practice the Iron Fist policy opposed the fundamental rights of human dignity, life, 
property, and freedom of association around which the European Union would be formed 
in less than a decade’s time.113  
a. Operation Peace for Galilee, 1982 
On 6 June 1982, Israel commenced Operation Peace for Galilee, invading 
Lebanon with a 57,000 man force.114 By 1 July Israel had defeated the Syrian forces in 
Lebanon and had encircled Beirut. Cutoff from food, water, and fuel, and vulnerable to 
air, artillery, and naval gunfire attacks, Yasser Arafat succumbed to Israel’s terms in 
August and departed Lebanon with the preponderance of the PLO. Following its siege of 
Beirut, Israel allowed Christian militias, namely the South Lebanon Army (SLA) and the 
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Lebanese Forces (LF), to operate freely in southern Lebanon resulting in the egregious 
treatment of the Muslim population, illustrated by the destruction of the Mieh Mieh 
Palestinian refugee camp and the massacre at the Sabra and Shatilla camps. As Israel’s 
occupation, which included an economic blockade on southern Lebanon, protracted 
Muslim resistance in southern Lebanon increased. Subsequently, Israel announced its 
withdrawal from Lebanon with the exception of a security zone in January 1985. 
Integrating the Iron Fist policy with its withdrawal, Israel conducted raids and blockades 
on Muslim village and continued its practice of terrorizing the civilian population.115 
Israel maintained the security zone until 2000. 
The ten members of the EC (Greece became a member in 1981) issued a joint 
statement on 9 June condemning the invasion on the grounds that it violated international 
law and basic human rights, and it endangered a settlement to the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 
Moreover, for the first time the EC threatened joint action against Israel. Three weeks 
later the European Council postponed the signing of a second financial protocol to the 
1975 trade agreement, canceled a scheduled cooperative meeting between EEC and 
Israeli delegations, froze contact between Israeli and European leadership, and 
individually established embargoes on military shipments to Israel.116 Although generally 
ineffective, the sanctions represented a strengthening of European joint action further 
demonstrated by its support of the UN and the multinational force in Beirut as well as its 
pledge to contribute to Lebanon’s reconstruction.117 
b. The Intifada, 1987–1993 
The First Palestinian Intifada began on 9 December 1987 in the Gaza Strip. 
Quickly expanding into the rest of the OPT, it lasted until 1993. Outraged by the Sabra 
and Shatilla refugee camp massacres, the forced departure of the PLO leadership from 
Lebanon, the absence of international support, and increasing repression, the Palestinians 
                                                 
115 Chris Mowles, “Israeli Occupation of South Lebanon,” Third World Quarterly 8, no. 4 (1986): 
1360–1363, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3991719.  
116 Greilsammer and Weiler, Europe’s Middle East Dilemma, 78; Kaya, Middle East Peace Process, 
87. 
117 Greilsammer and Weiler, Europe’s Middle East Dilemma, 92.  
32 
mobilized in a grassroots movement against the occupation.118 A non-violent uprising, 
the Intifada consisted of collective civil disobedience. Israel’s response, however, was 
violent and repressive and included economic sanctions, political assassinations, mass 
arrests, and torture. In total, 1,087 Palestinian civilians were killed, 237 of which were 
under the age of 17, and 50,000 Palestinians were arrested just within the first 18 
months.119 As was the case with Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, its response to the 
Intifada placed it at odds with the EU. 
In response to Israel’s management of the Intifada, the EC supported UN 
resolutions 605, 607, and 608, which recognized the illegal nature of the occupation and 
Israel’s execution of it, referring to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949. Like in the aftermath of Operation 
Peace for Galilee, the EC voted against three bilateral trade protocols with Israel, 
however, their show of soft power was short lived; the protocols were subsequently 
approved months later.120 
The period of time between 1973 and 1990 represents the nascence of both 
European foreign policy based on consensus and a European role in the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict. This period represents the declaratory phase of European foreign policy toward 
the Middle East. Beginning with its first joint statement following the October War in 
1973 to its most significant statement with the Venice Declaration, Europe sought a role 
in international politics but lacked the capacity to assert itself forcibly into politics 
traditionally controlled by the United States and the Soviet Union. Still, the developing 
European stance on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, often shaped by France, placed Europe 
outside of the American and Israeli blueprints for peace in the Middle East. Although 
complicating Europe’s relationship with the United States and Israel and effectively 
inhibiting its immediate influence on the peace process, Europe established the 
framework and position from which it would get involved in the future.  
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B. EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, 1991–1999 
1. The Madrid Peace Conference and Oslo Accords 
The coalition victory against Iraq in the Gulf War coupled with the decline of 
Cold War hostilities set the conditions for the United States to redirect its political efforts 
toward a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The United States sought a 
comprehensive settlement through an international conference with Palestinian 
representation based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, three positions 
fundamental to the European perspective on achieving peace in the Middle East. Co-
sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, the Madrid Peace Conference 
convened in October 1991 and was organized around two negotiating tracks: bilateral and 
multilateral. Although a participant in the proceedings at Madrid, Europe was excluded 
from the bilateral negotiations at the behest of Israel and the United States.121 Europe did 
assume a role in the multilateral negotiations, however, chairing the Regional Economic 
Development Working Group (REDWG), which was one of five multilateral working 
groups concerning the issues of water, refugees, arms control, ecology, and economics. 
The aim of the REDWG was to establish regional economic cooperation with the 
secondary objective of facilitating confidence building among the participants in support 
of the concurrent bilateral negotiations.122 The bilateral talks were held between Israeli 
and Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian-Jordanian delegations, but they stalled within a 
year in part because of the absence of an independent PLO delegation.123  
While the bilateral negotiations in Washington, DC, stumbled secret negotiations 
between the PLO and Israel in Oslo, Norway led to the Oslo Peace Process and the 
signing of the “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements” in 
August 1993. The Oslo framework sought a final peace settlement through the 
establishment of confidence building measures and a five year transitional period, 
scheduled to end in May 1999, during which final status issues, to include border 
delineation, Palestinian sovereignty, arms control, the right of return for Palestinian 
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refugees, and the status of Jerusalem, would be negotiated.124 Within the framework of 
the Oslo Peace Process Israel and Jordan signed a peace treaty in 1994, while Israel and 
the PLO signed a series of agreements to include the Oslo II protocol in September 1995, 
which designated zones and levels of Palestinian control and provided the timeline for 
Palestinian Council elections. Although again excluded from the negotiations, Europe 
was bolstered by the success of negotiations that included the PLO and Israel and the 
PA’s mutual recognition of each other, moves that the EU had advocated since the 
Venice Declaration. Moreover, the Oslo Peace Process marked a transition to a positive 
relationship with Israel and a greater role in the MEPP.  
2. EU-Palestinian Relations 
Still, throughout the Oslo Process the U.S. maintained the lead at the political 
level while the EU, which was inaugurated in November 1993, established its influence 
on the local and regional environment on which a lasting peace was predicated. 
Concentrating on financial and economic mechanisms, regional stabilization through 
multilateral approaches, and Palestinian state-building, the EU aimed to compliment the 
political sphere of the MEPP.125 As a result the EU became the principal financial donor 
to the Palestinians. EU objectives were to induce the Palestinian community to support 
the peace process by demonstrating the benefits of economic development, to include the 
moderation  of radicalism; to demonstrate to Israel that a stable democratic Palestinian 
state supports their national interests; and finally to foster reconciliation among the 
Palestinian and Israeli populations through the development of civil society.126 
Immediately following the signing of the Oslo Accords, the EU pledged 500 million 
European Currency Units (ECU) to the economic recovery and development of the 
Palestinian territories, representing one quarter of the total pledges received at the 
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“International Donor Conference to Support Middle East Peace.”127 Moreover, between 
1993 and 2001 EU financial contributions totaled €1.42 billion, and in addition EU 
member states committed €2.5 billion bilaterally.128 This assistance was used to improve 
the infrastructure within the OPT, establishing essential services through hospitals, 
schools, wells, and waste disposal as well as commercial infrastructure to include roads 
and the Gaza harbor and airport.129 European monies were also allocated in support of 
the Palestinian Council elections in 1996, and to assist in the establishment of rule of law 
through the creation of a Palestinian police force.130 Finally, Europe provided direct 
support for the budget of the Palestinian Authority (PA).131 While the Oslo process 
provided an avenue through which to influence the MEPP by providing financial and 
economic support to the PA, it also fostered regional cooperation between the EU and the 
belligerents of the Arab-Israeli Conflict and strengthened the EU’s relationship with 
Israel. 
3. Barcelona Process, 1995 
The Oslo process illuminated similarities between the political climate of Europe 
immediately following World War Two and the Middle East throughout the twentieth 
century. Israel came to see Europe as an example of how to achieve regional peace and 
stability.132 Shimon Peres, Israeli Foreign Minister during the Oslo Accords, stated that 
Israel’s “ultimate goal is the creation of a regional community of nations, with a common 
market and elected centralized bodies, modeled on the European Community.”133 He 
argued that regional cooperation would result in political stability, economic prosperity, 
national security, and democratization within the Middle East.134 It was in the spirit of 
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this renewed rapport that the EU recognized in the Essen Declaration in 1994 that “Israel, 
should ‘enjoy special status in its relations with the European Union on the basis of 
reciprocity and common interests.’”135 To that end, the EU launched the EMP in 
November 1995 between the fifteen member states of the EU and the Mediterranean 
states of Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Turkey, the 
PA, and Israel in an effort to increase regional cooperation through a combination of 
multilateral and bilateral approaches. The EMP pursued three objectives: the 
establishment of regional peace and stability, shared economic prosperity, and the 
promotion of cultural understanding within the region.136 According to the EMP, the 
principle elements necessary for stability in the Mediterranean were the same elements 
that had consistently framed EU declarations on the Arab-Israeli Conflict, namely respect 
for the territorial integrity of EMP members, respect for the right of self-determination, 
respect for fundamental human rights, and conflict resolution through peaceful means, all 
in accordance with the UN charter.137 One of the driving principles of the EMP was that 
economic underdevelopment within the Mediterranean was the root cause of regional 
instability; therefore, through the EMP the EU targeted regional economic development 
with the goal of achieving regional free trade by 2010.138  
Established independently from the United States, the EMP was meant to 
compliment the MEPP rather than replace it. It was designed to set the conditions from 
which the MEPP could succeed.139 Initially, the EMP was successful in this regard in 
part due to the fact that the confidence building measures built into the EMP focused on 
economic and regionally focused measures as opposed to those of a political nature 
captured by the MEPP. Moreover, the EMP picked up where multilateral forums under 
the Madrid process stopped including gaining the participation of Syria and Lebanon, 
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both of which refused to participate in the Madrid process. Furthermore, it recognized the 
PA as an equal partner in the process, giving credence to the concept of Palestinian self-
determination, yet another principle that the EU had advocated for more than a decade.140 
In regard to Israel’s participation in the EMP, the initial success of the Oslo Accords 
established Israel as a legitimate regional partner in the eyes of the Arab states.141 
Although Israel viewed itself as more closely aligned to Europe than the Mediterranean 
and it was concerned about the EMPs mission creep toward influencing the MEPP, the 
EMP represented a solution to Israel’s regional isolation, which presented a persistent 
economic and security threat to the state.142  In practice, the success of the EMP was 
dependent on the success of the Oslo Process. With the assassination of the Israeli Prime 
Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, in 1995 the MEPP suffered a major setback and subsequently 
the EMP stalled, failing to make significant progress in achieving regional peace and 
stability, shared economic prosperity, or cultural understanding within the region.  
The bilateral component of the EMP consisted of association agreements between 
the EU and the individual Mediterranean states. Signed in 1995, the EU-Israel 
Association Agreement was an upgrade to the 1975 cooperation agreement and consisted 
of provisions designed to promote economic cooperation, specifically in the agricultural, 
industrial, financial, and scientific and technological fields. Secondly, the agreement 
established a political dialogue between Europe and Israel. The dialogue was meant to 
“develop better mutual understanding and an increasing convergence of positions on 
international issues” to “enhance regional security and stability.”143 This political 
dialogue was built upon “a respect for human rights and democratic principles.”144 The 
political component of the association agreement failed to increase EU influence in the 
MEPP as Benjamin Netanyahu became Prime Minister of Israel in 1996. Moreover, the 
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Likud party’s rise to power ushered in another period in which Israel tried to minimize 
EU political involvement in resolving the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 
4. EU Political Resurgence in the Middle East Peace Process 
Popularity for the Oslo Accords waned significantly by 1994, demonstrated by 
Israeli and Palestinian acts of terrorism, to include the massacre of 29 Palestinians 
praying at a mosque in Hebron by the hand of an Israeli settler and Palestinian suicide 
attacks against Israeli military and civilian targets. Rabin’s assassination and the Israeli 
military response to Hezbollah-launched missiles against northern Israel further disrupted 
the peace process. The collapse of peace negotiations, however, was affirmed by the 
election of Netanyahu, a vocal critic of the Oslo Accords. Netanyahu entered office 
promoting the Israeli policy of “reciprocity” in which Israel would meet its treaty and 
peace process obligations when and only when the PA met its obligations.145 Of principal 
concern for Netanyahu was the cessation of Palestinian terrorism. In the spirit of 
reciprocity, he postponed previously agreed upon redeployments of Israeli forces from 
the OPTs and discontinued a four year freeze on settlement activity.146 Furthermore, he 
opened a second entrance to the Hasmonean Tunnel in East Jerusalem instigating violent 
riots among the Palestinians. The deterioration of the peace process and the loss of EU 
influence caused the EU to seek political action. In 1996, the EU began monitoring Israeli 
settlement activity and deployed a diplomatic mission. In November of that year the 
President of the European Council, Dick Spring, announced that “the EU had a 
responsibility both to the region and to itself to put the peace process back on track.”147  
To that end, an EU Special Envoy to the Peace Process was established in October.  
a. EU Special Envoy 
The EU Council of Ministers appointed Ambassador Miguel Moratinos, former 
Spanish Ambassador to Israel, as the EU Special Envoy to the Peace Process on 28 
October 1996. The mandate of the special envoy tasked Moratinos, among other things, 
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with keeping close contact with all parties to the peace process, promoting compliance 
with the standards of a liberal democracy, and scrutinizing Arab and Israeli actions that 
place a final peace settlement at risk.148 Most importantly, the mandate sought the special 
envoy’s input in EU policy-making in order to achieve the greatest political impact on the 
MEPP.149 Still opposed to European political or bilateral involvement in the peace 
process, Israel questioned EU motives while the United States reiterated its view that 
there was no bilateral role for Europe in the MEPP.150 In time, however, both nations 
accepted the EU Special Envoy, with Israel acknowledging a role for the EU in the 
bilateral process as a result of the envoy’s assistance in mediating the 1997 Hebron 
agreement, which re-established the Israeli redeployment schedule from Hebron.151 A 
significant event in EU foreign policy history, the Hebron agreement marked the first 
time the EU had a direct role in Middle East peace negotiations at the bilateral level. 
Subsequently, Moratinos continued supporting the United States in mediating the 
bilateral Israeli-Palestinian negotiations as well as supporting Israeli-Syrian negotiations. 
Furthermore, the EU, through the special envoy, initiated an assistance program aimed at 
supporting PA counterterrorism efforts in order to adhere to Netanyahu’s demand for 
security.152 The EU maintained the special envoy until 2000 proving through the duration 
that the EU could influence the Arab-Israeli Conflict through political mechanisms. The 
Oslo process, however, was still headed for collapse by the end of the twentieth century.   
b. Berlin Declaration 
The Oslo process had retarded following the Oslo II Accord in 1995 causing the 
Arab League to withdraw from multilateral track negotiations in 1997 due to the lack of 
progress. Recognizing the urgency of the political stalemate between Arafat and 
Netanyahu by 1997, the EU began a determined effort to save the Oslo process. 
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Releasing the “Call for Peace in the Middle East” document in June 1997, the EU called 
“upon the Israeli and Palestinian leadership to continue the negotiations to further the 
implementation of the Interim and Hebron Agreements and to resume talks on the 
Permanent Status.”153 Furthermore, the EU recognized the necessity for the parties 
involved to “abstain from unilateral actions prejudging the Permanent Status issues and to 
resume and maintain full security cooperation with the aim of fighting terrorism.”154 The 
EU followed shortly after with the Luxembourg Declaration in December, which called 
on Israel to make concessions in the interest of a final status agreement.155 Although 
negotiations had been conducted in 1997 and 1998 with the Hebron agreement and Wye 
Memorandum, respectively, these agreements only sought to facilitate the 
implementation of Oslo II. Moreover, by 1999 Israel had failed to meet its redeployment 
timelines and subsequently suspended the Wye Memorandum causing Netanyahu’s 
coalition to collapse effectively halting the peace process.156  
As Israel prepared for new elections in May 1999, Arafat threatened to declare 
Palestinian statehood on 4 May 1999, the previously established deadline for a final 
status agreement.157 Committed to the Oslo process and recognizing that the PA’s 
unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state would likely result in an outbreak of violence, 
the Israeli annexation of the OPT, and Netanyahu’s re-election the EU made its most 
significant declaration to date.158 On 25 March, it released the Berlin Declaration stating 
that  
The European Union reaffirms the continuing and unqualified Palestinian 
right to self-determination including the option of a state and looks 
forward to the early fulfilment of this right. It appeals to the parties to 
strive in good faith for a negotiated solution on the basis of the existing 
agreements, without prejudice to this right, which is not subject to any 
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veto. The European Union is convinced that the creation of a democratic, 
viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian State on the basis of existing 
agreements and through negotiations would be the best guarantee of 
Israel’s security and Israel’s acceptance as an equal partner in the region. 
The European Union declares its readiness to consider the recognition of a 
Palestinian State in due course in accordance with the basic principles 
referred to above.159 
Consistent with the spirit of its previous statements, the Berlin Declaration is significant 
because it marks the first time that the EU stated its readiness to recognize a Palestinian 
state. Furthermore, the EU’s statement created a linkage between Israel and a Palestinian 
state; however, it affirms that Palestinian statehood is a foregone conclusion that Israel 
must prepare for. The Berlin Declaration was successful in delaying Arafat’s 
proclamation, and although it further antagonized Israel’s Likud government it facilitated 
the renewal of the Oslo process following the election of Ehud Barak as Prime Minister 
of Israel. Immediately receptive to opening a dialogue with the Palestinians and his Arab 
neighbors, Barak re-opened talks with Syria as well as the PA and withdrew all Israeli 
forces from southern Lebanon by 2000. In July of that year, Barak and Arafat met at 
Camp David with President Clinton, but excluding EU representation, for the final status 
negotiations. Unable to come to agreement though, the Oslo Process dissolved. 
The eight years between the commencement of the Madrid process and the failure 
of final status negotiations at Camp David represented an evolution in EU participation in 
the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Prior to the Gulf War, the EU was kept outside of Arab-Israeli 
politics by the United States and Israel in large part because of its divergent perspective 
on the conflict. The Madrid Process, however, provided the EU an opportunity to 
influence the peace process and substantiated European principles regarding Middle East 
peace. . Although the EU remained blocked from bilateral involvement for most of this 
period it became the most influential player in the multilateral track. Coupled with its 
program for regional integration through the EMP, the EU became the primary financial 
donor to the Palestinian Authority. It built Palestinian capacity in order to influence the 
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peace process positively. Making further inroads into the peace process, the EU’s 
employment of a special envoy helped establish European agency in the peace process. 
Still, critical of Israeli unilateral actions and intransigence during the latter half of this 
period, goodwill between Israel and the EU faded, as did its ability to serve as a critical 
party to the peace process.  
C. MATURATION OF THE EUROPEAN POSTURE TOWARD MIDDLE 
EAST PEACE, 2000–2010 
1. The Al-Aqsa Intifada, 2000–2005 
On 28 September 2000, following Likud prime ministerial candidate Ariel 
Sharon’s inflaming visit to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem with police, politicians, and 
members of the media, the Al-Aqsa Intifada erupted in Israel and the OPT. Fueled by `the 
failure of the Oslo process, rampant corruption within the PA, and the humiliation 
associated with the occupation, the Al-Aqsa Intifada resulted in the death of more than 
3,000 Palestinians and 950 Israelis, only 301 of whom were members of Israeli security 
forces, by its completion in 2005.160 Unlike the widespread civil disobedience that 
characterized the First Intifada, this uprising was primarily carried out through the use of 
terror. The dominant tactic employed by Palestinian terror groups was the suicide attack, 
150 of which were conducted against Israeli targets during the Second Intifada.161 In 
contrast, Israel employed a strategy that targeted the terror groups and Palestinian 
civilians alike, although damage to the latter was predominant. Israeli tactics included the 
closure of the OPT in December 2000, which drastically contracted the OPT’s economy; 
targeted assassinations, totaling seventy between 2001 and 2002 alone; the construction 
of a security fence, which when complete will effectively annex 9.5% of the West Bank; 
and the re-occupation of West Bank territories ceded to Palestinian control during the 
Oslo process.162 The latter tactic came in the form of Operation Defensive Shield in 
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spring 2002 and included mass arrests, curfews, the physical isolation of Yasser Arafat, 
and the destruction of Palestinian homes and infrastructure.163  
The Intifada years represent the lowest point in EU-Israel relations, but it also 
marks one of the most active periods for the EU in establishing itself as a political player 
in the peace process. Although the EU attributed responsibility for the unrest with both 
the Palestinians and Israel and affirmed the necessity for reform within the PA, the EU 
condemned Israel for weakening the PA’s capacity to enact political and administrative 
reforms and combat terrorism.164 For the EU, Israel’s indiscriminate use of force; the 
destruction of Palestinian infrastructure, much of which was funded by the EU; ever-
increasing settlement activity; and restrictions on Palestinian freedom of movement 
represented rampant violations of international law and withheld from the Palestinians 
basic human rights.165 Moreover, the EU maintained that the greatest potential for 
establishing Israel’s security remained a “viable, democratic and peaceful sovereign 
Palestinian state.”166 To that end, the EU continued to seek a political resolution to the 
conflict, simultaneously gaining agency as an effective participant in the peace process.  
The EU continued to provide substantial financial assistance to the Palestinians 
throughout the Intifada and beyond with its aid totaling €3.3 billion between 2000 and 
2009; however, it began to make an impact politically as well.167 During Operation 
Defensive Shield, the EU negotiated the release and asylum of thirteen Palestinians 
following an Israeli siege of a church in Bethlehem housing Palestinian militants.168 
Viewed as a diplomatic success, the EU followed it up with participation in the Mitchell 
Committee, an American led fact-finding mission. The Mitchell report called for the 
cessation of violence across the board as well as Israel’s cessation of settlement activity. 
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Although it made little impact on the volatile situation in the Middle East it was 
significant in that Europe joined the United States in seeking a political resolution. This 
multilateralism would continue with the establishment of the Middle East Quartet. 
2. The Middle East Quartet 
Inaugurated in April 2002, the Middle East Quartet included the participation of 
the United States, the UN, Russia, and the EU. Based on the premise that the United 
States could not secure peace in the Middle East unilaterally as it had tried since the 
October War, the Quartet represented a multilateral approach to re-launching the peace 
process. It harnessed the international legitimacy of the UN, Russia’s historic ties to the 
Arab states, the EU’s primacy as a donor to the PA, and America’s role as political leader 
in the MEPP.169 The Quartet supported the Oslo process based on UN Security Council 
resolutions 242 and 338 but exceeded the confines of the Oslo process by publicly 
advocating for a two-state solution: the establishment of Israeli and Palestinian states 
“side by side within secure and recognized borders.”170 For the EU the Middle East 
Quartet was a mechanism through which it could influence the peace process, gain 
agency as a player in international politics, and influence U.S. foreign policy, especially 
its reengagement in the MEPP.171  
a. The Roadmap 
EU influence on the peace process and the United States extended to the 
Roadmap, the mechanism through which the Quartet envisioned achieving a final 
settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. The Roadmap was a three phased program 
based on an initiative drafted by the Danish EU presidency in August 2002. In its final 
form, it accounted for European preferences, to include reforms of the PA, the 
development of an international conference, a halt to all settlement activity, and improved 
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humanitarian conditions within the OPT.172 Phase one focused on the cessation of 
violence, the normalization of Palestinian life, and the establishment of Palestinian 
capacity to govern. Phase two consisted of the formal establishment of the Palestinian 
state, while phase three anticipated a final status agreement.173 The Roadmap sought the 
resolution of the conflict by 2005. Although the Quartet and the Roadmap facilitated 
growing EU influence, especially through its dominance in Palestinian capacity building 
and reform, it failed to be an effective multilateral organization. Neither Israel nor the PA 
honored their obligations as articulated in the Roadmap, while the United States 
leveraged its political might to gain Quartet support for its unilateral efforts. Still, 
although Israel was weary of the multilateral approach to the peace process, the EU’s 
participation in it facilitated Israeli acceptance of the EU as a political player.174  
3. The European Neighborhood Policy 
While the Intifada raged and the roadmap failed to improve Israeli-Palestinian 
relations, the EU introduced the ENP in 2003. Expanding on the EMP and based on its 
premise that political and economic development of individual member actors will 
increase regional security and stability, the EU created the ENP reaching out to Eastern 
Europe as well as the Mediterranean.175 Trading economic, judicial, administrative, and 
political reforms for deeper bilateral relations with Europe, the ENP rewarded a 
member’s increasing liberalization with greater access to EU programs and expanded 
economic and trade integration. In December 2004 the EU and Israel agreed on an ENP 
action plan, a move toward achieving a degree of integration including Israeli access to 
the EU internal market. This agreement sought to capitalize on the goodwill generated by 
Europe’s significant involvement in the Middle East Quartet. Picking up where the 1995 
Association Agreement failed, the EU-Israel Action Plan called for an “upgrade in the 
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scope and intensity of political co-operation.”176Specifically, the increased political 
dialogue would consist of Israel  
working together with the EU, on a bilateral basis and as a member of the 
Quartet, with the aim of reaching a comprehensive settlement of the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict and a permanent two-state solution with Israel 
and a Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security, in 
accordance with the Roadmap, and the obligations of the parties set out in 
it.177  
The action plan also promoted EU-Israeli cooperation at the multilateral level within the 
international community. Representing a significant strengthening of relations, the ENP 
established ten sub-committees covering political co-operation, justice and legal matters, 
and economic and financial matters, to name a few. As a result of the ENP’s success in 
facilitating stronger relations in the economic as well as political spheres, Israel sought an 
upgrade in cooperation in 2007; however, before an agreement could be implemented 
Israel initiated Operation Cast Lead in Gaza and in response the EU froze implementation 
of the upgraded bilateral agreement, marking yet another decline in EU-Israeli 
relations.178  
4. EU Crisis Management 
In August 2005 Israel executed its disengagement plan, vacating the Gaza Strip 
and northern Samaria in the West Bank. Israel intended for the disengagement to dissolve 
the peace process and strengthen its hold on the West Bank while still maintaining 
control of Gaza by controlling its airspace, its sea access, and movement in and out of 
Gaza.179 The disengagement plan was supported by the Quartet as a step in the right 
direction, and in November it brokered the “Agreement on Movement and Access,” 
which provided humanitarian relief and facilitated economic development for the 
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Palestinians as a result of increased freedom of movement to and from Gaza.180 
Incorporated in the agreement was the employment of a third party to monitor the Rafah 
border crossing. The EU, again in large part because of the legitimacy that accompanied 
its involvement in the Quartet, assumed this responsibility establishing the EU Border 
Assistance Mission (EUBAM) Rafah in November 2005. With EUBAM Rafah, the EU 
supervised the PA’s administration of the border crossing, representing a confidence 
building measure and an international guarantee of which the EU had been advocating 
since the Brussels Declaration of 1973.181 Although the EUBAM Rafah mission was 
suspended in 2007 following Israel’s imposition of a blockade on Gaza in response to 
Hamas’s seizure of power, it was a starting point for greater EU involvement in the 
conflict.  
Within a year of establishing EUBAM Rafah, the EU deployed another ESDP 
mission, the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL 
COPPS) responsible for supporting the Palestinian police with training, equipment, and 
guidance in support of Palestinian reform efforts. Like the ESDP mission in Rafah, 
EUPOL COPPS was hampered by the aftermath of Hamas’s rise to power; however, it 
helped reconstitute the PA security apparatus following its marginalization and damage 
to critical infrastructure during the Second Intifada.182 Finally, beginning in October 
2006, the EU assumed more than fifty percent of the force totals for the United Nations 
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which is responsible for ensuring the maintenance 
of peace between Israel and combatants such as Hezbollah in Lebanon. The EU even 
assumed responsibility for Maritime Task Force (MTF) UNIFIL, which secured the 
Lebanese coast from arms smuggling. Through UNIFIL, the EU assumed a critical role in 
maintaining peace between Hezbollah and Israel. Still in operation as of 2014, the 
deployment of these ESDP missions marked a turning point in EU relations with Israel. 
Not only was the EU the primary supporter of Palestinian reform and had established 
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greater political cooperation with Israel through the ENP, but for the first time in the 
Middle East the EU was conducting crisis management under the aegis of the ESDP, a 
significant expansion of its role as a political player. 
5. Operation Cast Lead 
On 27 December 2008, Israel commenced Operation Cast Lead, a coordinated air 
and ground assault into Gaza that continued until 21 January 2009. The latest and most 
significant of more than two dozen operations targeting Gaza since 2003, Operation Cast 
Lead was in response to increasing Palestinian rocket attacks from Gaza and commenced 
mere days after the expiration of a six month cease fire between Hamas and Israel. The 
operation was set in the context of a suffocating blockade on Gaza that banned all exports 
and fuel imports, crippled the United Nations Relief and Works Agency’s (UNRWA) 
ability to distribute food to Palestinian refugees, and resulted in 76% of the population in 
Gaza living below the poverty line.183 Moreover, it severed the goodwill between Israel 
and the EU that had been burgeoning since the EU’s commitment to the Middle East 
Quartet and the establishment of the EU-Israel Action Plan. During the execution of the 
incursion 1,417 Palestinians were killed and 4,336 were wounded, while 25 government 
buildings, 60 police stations, 34 hospitals, and 214 schools were destroyed or severely 
damaged.184 Additionally, more than 35,000 heads of livestock were killed and 15,000 
acres of farmland were destroyed.185 
Responding against both the blockade and Israel’s execution of Operation Cast 
Lead, the EU released a statement on 30 December calling for an immediate cease fire 
and the introduction of humanitarian aid into Gaza reiterating that the only viable 
solution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict was through political means.186 Significantly, the EU 
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demonstrated its commitment to the peace process by deploying personnel to coordinate 
aid distribution, sending a diplomatic mission to the Middle East, and proposing the re-
deployment of the EUBAM Rafah mission as well as additional border assistance 
missions.187 Finally, it affirmed its stance that a resolution to the conflict must be based 
on the establishment of two sovereign states side by side: Israel and Palestine.188 As 
mentioned previously, the EU suspended the upgraded EU-Israel Action Plan and 
pledged to withhold the improved relations until Israel ceased behavior that inhibited a 
two state solution, which included violations of international law such as settlement 
activity in East Jerusalem and the West Bank and human rights infringement.189 The 
European Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, stated very 
clearly that the EU 
as Israel’s partner and friend, expects the new Israeli government to help 
implement the vision of a two-state solution. Recent activities intended to 
create new facts on the ground in and around Jerusalem run counter to this 
vision. Living up to past agreements, including those made in the context 
of multi-lateral forums, is essential.190  
Inaugurated as Prime Minister of Israel for the second time in March 2009, Benjamin 
Netanyahu refused to endorse a two-state solution and resented the conditional nature of 
EU-Israeli relations.191 To that end, he established a condition of his own: either Europe 
temper its statements on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict or it will be excluded from the 
peace process.192 By the conclusion of 2010, Israel continued the blockade of Gaza and 
settlement activity in the OPT, and the EU’s troubled relationship with Israel continued. 
Although the EU had finally achieved status as an integral player in the peace process 
alongside the United States, it represented a spoiler to Israel’s vision of the final status. 
                                                 
187 Pardo and Peters, Israel and the European Union, 487. 
188 Ibid.   
189 Müller, EU Foreign Policymaking 64.  
190 Pardo and Peters, Uneasy Neighbors, 67.  
191 Barak Ravid, “Netanyahu: Europe Will Not Dictate Policy to Israel,” Haaretz, April 24, 2009, 
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/netanyahu-europe-will-not-dictate-policy-to-israel-1.274765.   
192 Miller, Inglorious Disarray, 193.  
50 
When the Al-Aqsa Intifada erupted in 2000 EU-Israeli relations were at an all-
time low. Through incremental movements, however, namely participation in the Middle 
East Quartet and a deepening of EU-Israeli economic and political cooperation through 
the ENP, Israel was getting closer to achieving that special status that the EU had 
envisioned in the Essen Declaration. Concurrently, the EU was strengthening its political 
agency through its support of Palestinian state building and its nascent crisis management 
operations. Instability in Israeli domestic politics and Israel’s unwavering commitment to 
security above all else clashed with the European prejudice toward Middle East peace 




In the thirty-seven years of engagement between the EU and Israel represented in 
the Arab-Israeli Conflict, EU foreign policy in the Middle East and specifically in 
relation to Israel has evolved and often set itself apart from the accepted strategies of the 
United States, the former Soviet Union, and the Arab world. The evolution of European 
foreign policy can be attributed to the nascence of a European foreign policy apparatus, 
namely the CSFP and the requirement to establish the necessary policy-making 
bureaucracy over time; however, the direction of its foreign policy is explained by the 
theoretical framework that underpins it. The realist and constructivist theories possess 
explanatory power, but they both fail to explain the permissive cause of EU foreign 
policy toward Israel. Liberalism, however, provides an explanation that girds the 
aforementioned foreign policy throughout the EU’s storied relationship with Israel. 
A. REALIST ARGUMENT 
In the realist perspective states seek security above all else, which is achieved 
through balance of power politics in which states ensure their security and maintenance 
of the status quo by assuming a strategy that maximizes relative power. Historically, 
power parity is achieved through hard balancing, which Art defines as the act of 
offsetting the burgeoning power of a threatening actor through increasing economic and 
military means.193 Essential to this interpretation is the conclusion that a physical threat 
to the state exists.194 The neorealist perspective maintains that the international political 
structure during the Cold War was based on a bi-polar system between the United States 
and the Soviet Union in which hard balancing had primacy. Moreover, the first twenty 
years of European engagement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict were set in the context of this 
bipolar system. The structure of this system facilitated a U.S. – EU relationship that 
                                                 
193 Robert J. Art, “Europe Hedges Its Security Bets,” in Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 
21st Century, ed. T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2004), 179–180.  
194 Ibid.  
52 
assured American protection of Europe from the Soviet threat while subordinating 
European interests to America’s and enabling Europe to focus on regional integration.195  
The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in an era of unipolarity with the 
United States becoming the single superpower possessing unrivaled power. This nascent 
unipolar international system was one in which no single state could balance against the 
United States.196 Structural realism maintains that the United States would use the new 
structure of the international system to secure its national interests without concern or 
appreciation for the interests and preferences of the other actors in the system thus 
generating fear among them regardless of the nature of America’s intentions.197 In order 
to ensure the achievement of European interests, arguably absent the capacity to balance 
the United States with military might and without fear of the United States posing an 
existential threat to the sovereignty of the European states, the EU accepted the unipolar 
structure of the international system but sought more agency in it. In affirmation of 
Walt’s representation of soft balancing in which second tier states establish 
“countervailing coalitions designed to thwart or impede specific policies” of the 
superpower, the neorealist soft balancing argument maintains that the EU sought to 
balance U.S. preferences specifically regarding the Arab-Israeli Conflict using 
diplomatic, economic, and operational means.198 The strongest evidence in support of the 
soft balancing argument is the EU’s attempt at a European peace initiative with the 
Venice Declaration of 1980. The inherent weaknesses of the soft balancing argument, 
however, are that European participation in the peace process since 1991 has 
complemented U.S. interests, rather than balanced them; that the U.S. demonstrates 
benign intent toward the EU, which mitigates the need for balancing; and that EU 
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military cooperation fills a security void as a result of reduced American presence as 
opposed to growing U.S. military strength. 
The Venice Declaration was released during the Cold War when the international 
system was still identified as a bipolar structure. Still, the EU aimed to establish political 
influence in the Arab Israeli Conflict autonomous from American efforts. All American 
engagement regarding the Arab-Israeli Conflict was shaped by the context of the Cold 
War. Although Europe recognized the importance of the Middle East in cold war politics, 
it saw the conflict primarily as a regional issue. As soon as it became evident to the EU 
that the Camp David Accords would not achieve a peaceful resolution to the wider Arab-
Israeli Conflict, Europe sought its own initiative based on a comprehensive peace 
settlement. In the several years preceding the Venice Declaration, the United States 
pursued its own interests in the Middle East. These interests were in conflict with the 
European interest of economic security as well as Europe’s pursuit of greater 
international influence. Increasing the tension was the White House’s insistence that all 
political participation in the Middle East be left to the United States.199 Although the EU 
did not fear American aggression, it was weary of America’s ever-increasing autonomy 
in decision-making in the Middle East. For this reason Europe attempted to soft balance 
the United States with its own independent peace initiative. The Venice Declaration, 
however, failed to establish the conditions necessary for balancing as a result of Europe’s 
weak political position within the international system, Israel’s failure to recognize the 
EU as a legitimate actor in the region, and the United States’ depiction of a European 
peace initiative as “an act of open hostility towards America.”200 
While the neorealist soft balancing argument maintains that second tier states will 
cooperate in order to offset the unmatched power of a unipolar actor like the United 
States in order to defend against the direct or indirect security threat of which it poses, 
this does not explain EU foreign policy in the Middle East.201 Instead, history 
demonstrates that the EU complemented American political power in the Middle East 
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with its involvement in the Madrid and Oslo Peace Accords, the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP) and the Middle East Quartet. During the Madrid process the EU was 
an active participant in the multilateral track establishing the necessary conditions for 
subsequent bilateral negotiations. Following the Oslo Accords Europe took the lead role 
in the Palestinian state-building project, which supported confidence building measures 
and increased the potential for sustainable peace in the region. The EU further 
complemented American foreign policy by establishing the EMP through which it 
reinforced the need to increase regional stability through economic development within 
the Middle East. Regional dialogue and cooperation was a necessary condition for the 
success of the MEPP, and it was only through the EMP that this occurred. Finally, after 
American unilateral efforts failed to facilitate peace, the EU joined the U.S. in the Middle 
East Quartet under the premise that each member state brought specific capabilities that 
when combined increased the likelihood for success. Throughout most of this period 
following the fall of the Soviet Union, the EU advocated for a different approach to the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict than the United States; however, recognizing that it did not have the 
capabilities to balance the United States, the EU chose to compliment American efforts. 
 Critical to the neorealist explanation of soft balancing is the notion that the 
unipolar power has unrivaled capacity, and it threatens the sovereignty of second-tier 
states with military power.202 No such threat has existed between the United States and 
Europe since the end of the Cold War. While the U.S. has fielded political postures that 
diverged from the European political perspective in regard to achieving peace in the 
Middle East, it did not represent a threat to EU security. Therefore, balancing whether 
through military expansion or through diplomatic and economic means was unnecessary 
and contrary to the interests of the EU.   
The creation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999 set the 
stage for a unified European military capacity. Since then the concept has evolved and 
expanded, although since its inception the ESDP has pursued the capability to conduct 
limited military and crisis management operations on behalf of the EU. These operations 
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were limited to humanitarian operations, military advice and assistance, conflict 
prevention, peace-keeping, peace-making, and post-conflict stabilization. In support of 
this mission set, the member states of the EU committed to build a military force that 
would not exceed 15 brigades or 60,000 personnel.203 Moreover, outside of sustained 
operations like UNIFIL and EUBAM Rafah, these operations would be of short duration, 
not to exceed two years, for stability and reconstruction operations.204 Following the end 
of cold war hostilities, the EU had to account for changes in U.S. national interests and 
according to the former director of the European Union Institute for Security Studies 
(EUISS) “the Europeans had to reorganize themselves to assume their share of the 
responsibility in crisis management and in doing so, maintain or even enhance the United 
States’ interest within the Alliance.”205 By developing the capability for crisis 
management operations such as those conducted in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
(OPT), the EU has established a role for itself in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: one that the 
United States demonstrates no interest in fulfilling. Furthermore, rather than balancing 
the United States, it complements American political efforts in the Middle East by 
enforcing stability. The realist perspective views the EU’s burgeoning military capacity 
as an attempt to balance the United States; however, even if its intention was to balance 
American military power, the gap is too great. 
B. CONSTRUCTIVIST ARGUMENT 
The realist explanation for EU foreign policy toward Israel is predicated on the 
notion that the structure of the international system is derived from its anarchical nature 
and that as a result of the constraints of the system’s structure states seek power as the 
means to maintaining state security. In the realist perspective, the architecture of the 
international system forces state actions and policies. The constructivist theory also 
maintains that the international system is based on anarchy; however, in this perspective 
states’ behavior is a result of social interaction between actors. As socialization occurs 
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over time the potential for cooperation between states increases because the actors can 
anticipate each other’s behavior. A component of constructivism is the concept of a 
strategic culture and its impact on international politics. An appropriate treatment of 
strategic culture for this argument, as constructed by Giles’, defines it as the “shared 
beliefs, assumptions, and modes of behavior derived from the common experiences and 
accepted narratives (both oral and written), that shape collective identity and relationships 
to other groups, and which determine appropriate ends and means for achieving security 
objectives.”206 From the constructivist perspective, the EU’s foreign policy actions 
toward Israel are formed as a result of a centuries-old socialization process with the 
Zionists based on complimentary strategic cultures. This relationship is demonstrated by 
Europe’s attempts at regional integration through the EMP and the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) as well as sustained economic relations. Although elements 
of this argument represent causal factors in the determination of EU foreign policy 
toward Israel, this argument is insufficient because though there are cultural ties between 
the Zionists and the EU, Israel has a strategic culture that is inconsistent with the 
European strategic culture. Furthermore, the socialization process between the two actors 
has only been successful in anticipating behaviors in the economic sphere and not in the 
political sphere. 
Strategic culture derives, as argued by Jones, from “a macro-environmental level 
consisting of geography, ethno-cultural characteristics, and history; a societal level 
consisting of social, economic, and political structures of a society; and a micro level 
consisting of military institutions and characteristics of civil-military relations.”207 In 
Europe, although cultural variances exist in varying degrees among the European states, 
to include language, the states are linked by geographic proximity and most importantly a 
shared history that includes the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, World War II, and the 
Cold War. Integrated into this history are the Zionists whose quest for a Jewish homeland 
was in many ways spurred by the Enlightenment and the impact of the French Revolution 
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and who brought with them the European liberal tradition.208 The strength of this cultural 
connection is illustrated by Kundera: 
The great Jewish figures, exiled from their land of origin and thus lifted 
above nationalist passions, have always shown an exceptional feeling for a 
supranational Europe – a Europe conceived not as territory but as a 
culture. Even after Europe so tragically failed them, the Jews nonetheless 
kept faith with that European cosmopolitanism; thus it is that Israel, their 
little homeland regained, strikes me as the true heart of Europe – a strange 
heart located outside the body.209  
While there was cultural convergence between Europe and Israel, it was World War II 
and the Cold War that has had the greatest single effect on European strategic culture. 
Although the member states of the EU had different experiences during these periods, the 
common thread that emerged was that war was catastrophic and must be averted; 
therefore, the role of the military should be deterrence and territorial defense.210 
Moreover, politically these states should pursue the role of civilian powers fixated on soft 
power, including diplomatic and economic mechanisms, to shape international 
politics.211 Through the constructivist lens, it is in the spirit of this European strategic 
culture, historical bond with Israel, and proclivity toward civilian power that Europe 
approaches its foreign policy, especially regional integration. 
The Oslo Peace Accords marked a turning point in European-Israeli relations and 
the reaffirmation of shared culture between the EU and Israel. At this time, Israel saw the 
EU as an example of successful regional integration based on shared norms and values, 
while the EU recognizing that “Israel should ‘enjoy special status in its relations with the 
European Union on the basis of reciprocity and common interests,’” sought to capitalize 
on their complimentary strategic cultures with the initiation of the EMP and, less than a 
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decade later, the ENP.212 An attempt at generating regional stability in the southern 
Mediterranean, the EU developed the EMP in part to “establish a partnership in social, 
cultural, and human affairs . . . promoting understanding between societies and improving 
their mutual perception.”213 Comprised of multilateral and bilateral programs, the EMP 
was a continuation of the socialization process that was ongoing for decades and used the 
strengthening of economic relations as a mechanism for establishing closer political 
relations. Expanding on the progress of the EMP, the EU launched the ENP in 2003, 
which sought even closer political cooperation, cooperation at the multilateral level, and 
economic integration. Through each agreement, cooperation between the actors increased 
because both the EU and Israel were able to anticipate expected behavior from each other 
as a result of their changing identities throughout the socialization process. 
While Israel established itself as a state and defined its role in the region and 
internationally in the years following statehood, the European Economic Community 
(EEC) concentrated on European integration. Seeking a partner through which it could 
alleviate its regional isolation, Israel immediately sought strengthened relations with the 
EEC, and in 1958 it became the third state to establish full diplomatic relations with the 
EU, but it sought more – associate membership in the EEC. Supported by geographic 
proximity, cultural ties, and Israeli dependence on European economic markets, the 
growing relationship was centered along economic lines, but it was shared history that 
facilitated cooperation. By 2010, the EU became Israel’s largest import partner and its 
largest export market with trade totaling €25.3 billion.214 Through the EMP scientific and 
technological cooperation increased and impediments to trade were reduced including 
barriers to cross-border employment. Subsequently, the ENP sought to expand EU-Israeli 
relations from economic and political cooperation to integration on the grounds of a 
“wider-Europe” that shared “the EU’s fundamental values and objectives.”215 A 
consistent socialization process based on congruent strategic cultures encouraged EU-
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Israeli cultivation along economic lines for decades; however, while Europe hoped to use 
that relationship to build political cooperation and behaved accordingly, this failed to 
materialize. 
The foundation of the constructivist argument for EU foreign policy decision-
making toward Israel is the similarity between the strategic cultures of the EU and Israel 
as a result of a storied relationship and shared history. Their strategic cultures, however, 
diverged following the Six Day War. Instead, Israel has adopted a strategic culture that is 
more aligned with that of the United States.216 While Europe after World War II avoided 
building military capacity in favor of diplomatic mechanisms, Israel adopted a culture 
that depended on its military and security apparatus for survival. Especially since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Europe has not faced an existential threat, while Israel has 
faced conventional threats from neighboring Arab states as well as terrorism and 
insurgencies from within the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT).217 To that end, 
Israel maintains a conscription-based military and commits a large percentage of its 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to the development and sustainment of its military 
capacity.218 Moreover, it has cultivated a strategic culture characterized by unilateral 
action and preemption.219 In contrast, the EU has employed diplomacy through 
multilateralism almost exclusively in international politics, while advocating conflict 
resolution through international mediums. While it is true that Europe has tried to exploit 
shared histories and like values to shape its relationship with Israel, the constructivist 
argument fails to explain its foreign policy behavior adequately. The radical separation 
between European and Israeli political perspectives, especially in regard to the Arab-
Israeli Conflict, is a result of these divergent strategic cultures and the failure of their 
socialization process to produce stable expectations of behavior between them.  
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While the EU’s economic relationship with Israel is important to Europe, it has 
pursued strengthened relations with Israel over the last several decades with the intention 
of developing political relations that can be leveraged toward peace in the Middle East. 
Europe continued to increase the economic cooperation between the actors over the years 
beginning with a limited commercial agreement in 1964, a free trade agreement in 1975, 
the EU-Israel Association Agreement, and the EU-Israel Action Plan in order to cultivate 
shared norms across the political spectrum. Israel, however, has consistently and 
successfully rejected the coalescing of economic interests and political cooperation. This 
separation between economic and political cooperation illustrates the weakness of the 
constructivist and strategic culture argument; although a causal factor behind certain 
aspects of European policy action toward Israel, it fails to explain the plurality of 
Europe’s behavior toward Israel. 
C. LIBERAL INTERNATIONALIST ARGUMENT 
Liberal internationalist IR theory is built on the premise that the interests of the 
individual are fundamental to global peace and prosperity.220 Moreover, as depicted by 
MacMillan, the theory posits “an insistence upon the moral primacy of the individual and 
a tradition of political and philosophical interests in the conditions of individual freedom, 
or autonomy.”221Inherent in the liberal conception of individual freedom is the universal 
entitlement to human rights, to include the right to political, economic, social, and 
cultural self-determination; the right to economic and social benefit; the right to 
democratic representation; civic rights; and freedom from arbitrary authority.222 For 
political actors that subscribe to this theory, its objectives are global economic 
development, enduring peace, and the diffusion of liberal ideals in international 
politics.223 These objectives are achieved through the employment of democratic 
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governance underwritten by the rule of law, collective security apparatus, cooperative 
frameworks, and multilateralism.224  
Since the earliest instances of political integration among the EC following the 
October War, Europe’s foreign policy has been guided by the principles of liberal 
internationalism. The European Security Strategy (ESS) confirms the pervasiveness of 
this perspective with its declaration that “spreading good governance, supporting social 
and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of 
law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the world order.”225 
The ESS goes on to describe one of Europe’s foreign policy objectives as “the 
development of a stronger international society, well-functioning, international 
institutions and a rule-based international order.”226 Liberal internationalism is the 
permissive cause of EU foreign toward Israel. Every foreign policy action taken by 
Europe in the context of the Arab-Israeli Conflict was guided by its liberal ideals. While 
economic security and economic interests, attempts at soft balancing the United States, 
and a historic connection to Israel colored EU foreign policy, it was Europe’s liberal 
internationalist foundation that drove its foreign policy. This explanation is demonstrated 
by the EU’s persistent efforts in protecting Palestinian rights, its employment of 
multilateralism toward resolving the Arab-Israeli Conflict, and the primacy of its role in 
Palestinian state-building.  
The Universal Declaration of Rights, adopted by the UN in 1948, declares in 
article 28 that “everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights 
set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”227 Voted for by every European 
member of the UN General Assembly, the Declaration of Rights established the liberal 
baseline for the acceptable treatment of people within the international system. 
Subsequently, Europe generated foreign policy responses to violations of these rights 
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throughout the duration of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. In the Brussels Declaration, the 
Europe’s first substantive statement on the conflict, the EU highlighted the rights of the 
Palestinians and Israel’s obligation to recognize those rights.228 A posture that was 
divergent from the United States, Europe’s initial foray into the politics of the Arab-
Israeli Conflict and Middle East peace established the European liberal framework for a 
future peace initiative. While European policy decisions regarding the Arab-Israeli 
Conflict and Europe’s relationship with Israel changed throughout the duration of the 
conflict, Europe’s commitment to the protection of civilians, a liberal ideal, influenced all 
of its foreign policy behavior. Examples of this undertaking include the EU’s response to 
Israel’s invasion of Lebanon and its implementation of the Iron Fist Policy. The EU 
condemned Israel’s actions and the trampling of universal human rights and for the first 
time employed a limited sanctions regime in defense of Europe’s liberal sensibilities.229 
During the First Intifada, Europe again attempted to utilize non-military coercion to 
influence Israeli behavior.230 Finally, in response to Operation Cast Lead, Europe 
deployed crisis management and humanitarian assistance personnel to alleviate 
Palestinian humanitarian concerns.231 Throughout the conflict and in response to Israel’s 
ever-increasing settlement activity, heavy-handed enforcement tactics, and repression of 
Palestinian political and economic freedoms Europe countered with either declaratory 
statements or limited diplomatic action. Most significantly, however, it increased its 
dedication to facilitating a solution to the conflict that would protect individual freedoms, 
support Palestinian self-determination, and achieve enduring peace.  
Multilateralism, as defined by Ruggie, is “an institutional form which coordinates 
relations among three or more states on the basis of ‘generalized’ principles of 
conduct.”232 The EU assigns priority to multilateralism in pursuit of its interests.233 
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While multilateralism looks different across the international system, European 
multilateralism is founded on the principles of liberalism and is centered around the 
concepts of adhering to international law, consensus building as the primary method for 
conflict resolution, and eschewing the employment of military might.234 Furthermore, the 
attainment of global prosperity encompasses the European approach to security, rather 
than unilateral force.235  
While the EU is in itself a multilateral organization, for this argument the EU will 
be treated as a unitary actor. Since the Brussels Declaration, however, the EU advocated 
a multilateral approach to reaching a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 
In its first substantive statement, the EU coupled any peace settlement to international 
guarantees under the framework of the UN. It reaffirmed this posture in the London and 
Venice declarations in which the EU reiterated its support of peace negotiations inclusive 
of all concerned parties, to include the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).236 
Although the EU was a vocal advocate for a multilateral solution to the conflict, it was 
not able to operationalize it until the Madrid Accords. At that time the EU assumed a 
critical role in the multilateral track of negotiations assuming the chair for the Regional 
Economic Development Working Group (REDWG). Committed to multilateralism and 
consistently blocked from bilateral engagement with Israel at the political level, the EU 
increased its efforts at multilateralism with the EMP and ENP programs. In keeping with 
the liberal principal of economic development and sustainable peace, it focused on 
measures to build economic and political cooperation regionally. The EU through this 
multilateral approach was able to bring all parties of the Arab-Israeli Conflict together in 
dialogue in a multilateral forum. Europe’s decades-long pursuit of a multilateral approach 
to the peace process, accepted by all parties, finally came to fruition with the 
establishment of the Middle East Quartet in 2002 after American unilateral efforts had 
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failed. Like its protection of civilians, multilateralism was a part of Europe’s liberal 
internationalist foreign policy posture from its earliest engagements in the Middle East.  
The universal right to self-determination is one of the foundational principles of 
liberal internationalism. Requisite for self-determination is the cultivation of a national 
identity. Again guided by the principles of liberal internationalism, the EU was the first 
political actor to recognize publicly the Palestinians as an identity group. Moreover, the 
EU reaffirmed the Palestinian right to express their national identity, as well as the 
requirement for a homeland for that national group. This line of thinking extended to 
recognizing the Palestinian right to self-determination with the Venice Declaration in 
1980. Like the operationalization of its multilateral approach, Europe’s pursuit of 
Palestinian political, economic, and social freedoms was not manifested until the Oslo 
Accords in 1993. The Palestinian interim self-government and confidence building 
measures negotiated through the Oslo Accords provided the EU the opportunity to 
operationalize their liberal ideals and gain a foothold in the peace process. The 
achievement of a Palestinian state was contingent on the Palestinians demonstrating the 
capacity to govern, which included establishing the monopoly on violence within its 
territory; therefore, the EU set out to support the development of Palestinian governance. 
Characteristics of good governance in the liberal paradigm are that it is representative, 
accountable, transparent, responsive, and consistent with the rule of law.237 Initially, the 
EU establishing itself as the principal donor for the Palestinian state-building project 
committed millions of Euros to facilitate Palestinian Council elections and infrastructure 
development. This assistance increased over time to include Palestinian Authority (PA) 
security sector training and training and oversight of nascent Palestinian institutions.238 
While the financial support, training and mentoring has yet to result in Palestinian 
statehood, it is representative of the EU’s liberal internationalist stance, which guides all 
of its foreign policy behavior toward Israel.  
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The primary critique of this liberal internationalist explanation is that EU foreign 
policy is guided by realist thought, namely the pursuit of unilateral power, and it is 
merely cloaked in the ideals of liberalism.239 This critique is unconvincing. Although it is 
true that an economically developed Mediterranean region in which the local actors 
interact through multilateral forums and through which a peaceful resolution to the Arab-
Israeli Conflict can be achieved will serve European interests, the pursuit of power and 
self-interest is not the primary motive. The empirical evidence demonstrates that the 
primary factor influencing EU foreign policy toward the Middle East and specifically 
Israel is the pursuit of sustainable peace, economic development, and representative 
government – globally. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH CONDUCTED 
Relations between Europe and Israel can be characterized as historically strong in 
respect to economic cooperation, but in matters of politics and social affairs the 
relationship between the actors can be accurately defined as volatile. This incendiary 
relationship is best illustrated in the context of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.  
Beginning in 1973 in the immediate aftermath of the October War, formalized EU 
engagement with Israel fostered an ineffective and at times caustic political relationship. 
Maturing through the course of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, however, EU foreign policy 
transitioned from declaratory in nature during the nascent years of European foreign 
policy consensus following the October War to multilateral during the Madrid and Oslo 
years, and finally, it assumed an operational role since the Al Aqsa Intifada. During the 
declaratory period, the EU established the framework from which it would base its 
foreign policy in the Brussels, London, and Venice declarations in response to Israeli 
actions following the October War, the Lebanon War, and the Intifada. The European 
political stance gave credence to the Palestinian cause and set itself apart from the 
policies of the United States and Israel. Entering the Madrid and Oslo years amid an 
antagonistic relationship with Israel, the EU developed positive relations following the 
initial success of the Madrid and Oslo processes. Demonstrating to Israel the benefits of 
regional integration, the EU made significant progress, primarily through multilateral 
mechanisms, in deepening political relations with Israel while gaining prominence in the 
Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) through its capacity-building efforts with the PA. In 
the aftermath of Netanyahu’s election, increased settlement activity, and the collapse of 
the Oslo process, the EU responded with the Berlin declaration thus once again 
weakening EU-Israeli political relations. In the years following the Al-Aqsa Intifada, the 
EU assured its presence in Middle East politics through its involvement in the Middle 
East Quartet as well as its crisis management operations, but again reacting to Israeli 
actions during the Intifada and Operation Cast Lead, it displayed a political posture in 
conflict with Israel. After a volatile relationship that witnessed highs and lows throughout 
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three decades of European engagement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, the EU became a 
player in international politics, but it remains to be seen whether Europe can establish 
sustained positive political relations with Israel and whether it can be a part of the 
solution in achieving Middle East peace. This thesis attempts to understand the 
permissive cause of Europe’s foreign policy toward Israel. Through detailed examination 
of European engagement with Israel during the Arab-Israeli Conflict observed through 
the lenses of realism, constructivism, and liberalism, this study concludes that the theory 
of liberal internationalism possesses the greatest explanatory power.  
The realist argument details Europe’s attempt to balance American regional 
hegemony through diplomatic and economic means in order to secure European interests 
and protect itself from the unrestrained power of the United States. This study elucidated 
the weaknesses of this argument, demonstrating that since structural changes in the 
international system brought on by the end of the Cold War there has been no evidence of 
European soft balancing in the context of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The lone EU foreign 
policy action that resembles soft balancing was the attempted European Peace Initiative; 
however, it occurred within the context of a bipolar international system in which Europe 
was aligned with the United States. The empirical evidence validates this assertion by 
showing that EU foreign policy complemented American foreign policy regarding peace 
in the Middle East, the U.S. is not a credible threat to Europe, and nascent European 
military capacity is in response to American isolation, rather than any threatening 
behavior. 
The constructivist argument maintains that EU foreign policy in respect to Israel is 
dictated by a decades-long socialization process that has occurred as a result of sustained 
engagement between Europe and Israel. Moreover, this socialization process has been 
cultivated by congruent strategic cultures. Although the actors share certain cultural 
attributes and historical narratives, this study demonstrates that the constructivist 
argument is insufficient because in truth the strategic cultures of Europe and Israel are 
divergent. While Europe’s response to the aftermath of World War II and the Cold War 
was to avoid military action and instead focus on diplomacy, Israel organized the state 
and its culture around the notion that security has primacy. As a result of these divergent 
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strategic perspectives, stable relations between Europe and Israel have manifested only 
through economic cooperation.  
The liberal internationalist argument is framed around the liberal ideals of 
individual freedom, universal rights, and enduring peace and possesses the greatest power 
in explaining EU foreign policy toward Israel. Every European policy decision made in 
the context of the Arab-Israeli Conflict was made within the structure of liberal 
internationalism. This study demonstrated liberal internationalism’s explanatory power 
by elucidating the three primary elements of EU foreign policy: protection of civilian 
rights, multilateralism and state-building. All three of these elements have a dominant 
and sustained role in European engagement with Israel and pre-dated the European 
Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), with the exception of Palestinian state-building, 
While national and supranational interests make it into the European policy-making 
formula, it is the ideals of liberal internationalism that ultimately shape European 
behavior toward Israel.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The historiography of the Arab-Israeli Conflict portrays decades of failed attempts 
to achieve sustainable peace in the Middle East, generate stability in the region, and 
establish a final solution to the question of Palestine. This effort has largely been led by 
the United States, although the closest the Palestinians and Israelis ever came to a final 
resolution was the Oslo process, which was initiated bilaterally between them without 
international interference. The Oslo process failed and in the decades since, the security 
situation has deteriorated, and Israeli settlement activity has increased; therefore, the 
likelihood of a bilateral solution is almost nonexistent. Arguably, the greatest chance at 
sustainable peace between the Palestinians and Israel is through a multilateral approach. 
Although the Middle East Quartet was inaugurated in 2002, it also failed to achieve a 
sustainable resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. The failure was due in large part 
to a divergence in political philosophies between its members and a failure to gain 
leverage against both Israel and the PA.  
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To achieve a convergence of political perspectives and to gain leverage against 
the parties to the conflict, the members of the Middle East Quartet must gain an 
understanding of each member’s interests and the guiding forces behind their foreign 
policies. The identification of the ideals of liberal internationalism as the permissive 
cause of EU foreign policy in respect to Israel provides U.S. policy-makers the 
information they need to shape the actions of the Middle East Quartet around a common 
framework. Moreover, by understanding the conditions in the Middle East that must be 
met to gain European support, the U.S. can and must expend political energy 
domestically and bilaterally with Israel to gain support for that framework. The U.S. 
grants Israel more aid than any other nation and it is arguably Israel’s most important 
ally. In contrast, the EU is the primary financial donor to the PA and committed to 
creating the conditions for Palestinian statehood. Together, the unwavering efforts of 
both actors are essential to the successful achievement of peace in the Middle East, but 
first the United States must recognize that any effective multilateral approach must 
appeal to Europe’s liberal internationalist political perspective. 
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